The Voting Paradox in Socially Integrated Populations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 2302828 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ole-Jørgen Skog (Department of Sociology, Stockholm University and National Institute for Alcohol and Drug Research, Oslo), Ole‐jørgen Skog (Stockholm University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 207-222 |
| Publication date | 1993-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Acta Sociologica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0001-6993 • E-ISSN: 1502-3869 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/000169939303600305 |
| OpenAlex | W2079986177 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 19 |
The paper addresses the problem of aggregating individual choices between three discrete alternatives, and discusses how the likelihood of cyclical aggregate preferences under majority rule depends on social integration in large populations. It is argued that the so- called impartial culture condition gives rather limited information as to the likelihood of the paradox occurring, and an alternative model is outlined. Social structure is introduced, by imposing correlation between the first and second choices. The resulting structure may significantly reduce the likelihood of a cyclical outcome A measure of similarity between rankings is introduced, and this measure serves as a vehicle for discussing the effects of social integration on the distribution of the population across the six possible rankings of alternatives. It is concluded that integration significantly reduces the like lihood of a cyclical outcome
Aggregate (composite · Data mining · Econometrics · Economics · Majority rule · Mathematical economics · Measure (data warehouse · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Population · Similarity (geometry · Social choice theory · Sociology · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Paradox of voting under an urn model
Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Social Choice
Formal Models of Legislative Processes
Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures
The Geometry of Majority Rule
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2003 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |