"Volonté Generale" and the Instability of Spatial Voting Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 5917575 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ole-Jørgen Skog (National Institute for Alcohol and Drug Research, Oslo, and Department of Sociology, University of Stockholm), Ole‐jørgen Skog (Institute of Alcohol Studies, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 271-285 |
| Publication date | 1994-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Rationality and Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1043-4631 • E-ISSN: 1461-7358 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/1043463194006002006 |
| OpenAlex | W2167161486 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 11 |
The theory of spatial voting games suggests that majority winners are extremely rare phenomena, and hence that there may be no such thing as a "volonté generale." It is argued in this article that the theory is founded on an empirically unrealistic assumption. This assumption is relaxed and an empirically meaningful criterion for stability is derived
Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Voting · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Why so much stability
Social Choice and Individual Values
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
Social Choice
Formal Models of Legislative Processes
The Geometry of Majority Rule
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2003 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |