Voting One Issue at a Time
The Question of Voter Forecasts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3289442 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James M Enelow (Stony Brook University), Melvin J Hinich |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 435-445 |
| Publication date | 1983-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1958927 |
| OpenAlex | W2042262907 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 7 |
When issues (i.e., dimensions) are voted on one at a time, a voter whose preferences are not separable across issues must forecast the outcome of later issues in order to know how to vote in the present. This is the problem of expectations. In this article, we develop a general theory designed to handle this problem. Assuming that voters are risk averse and maximize expected utility, we demonstrate that a random variable forecast of how later issues will be decided reduces to a point forecast, which is the mean of the multidimensional random variable. We also show that single-peaked preferences are induced on each issue, and consequently there exists an equilibrium across issues
Econometrics · Economics · Mathematical economics · Order (exchange · Outcome (game theory · Point (geometry · Political science · Politics · Random variable · Separable space · Statistics · Variable (mathematics · Voting · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Finance · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
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Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation
A Theory of the Budgetary Process
An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,26 |
| Citation span | 1984 - 2014 (31) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |