The Politics of Regulation
From New Institutionalism to New Governance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232825 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Carrigan (Harvard University), Cary Coglianese (0000-0002-5496-2104, University of Pennsylvania Law School and Department of Political Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 107-129 |
| Publication date | 2011-06-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev.polisci.032408.171344 |
| OpenAlex | W2128787987 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
| References cited | 110 |
The study of the politics of regulation has followed two distinct paths in recent years. “New institutionalism” research has focused primarily on the policy-making process, particularly the interplay between regulators (who implement policy) and their political principals (who attempt to control regulators' activity). In contrast, “new governance” scholarship has focused on strategies other than traditional “command-and-control” regulation that can encourage compliance with socially valued norms of behavior. Although these two lines of research approach highly distinct facets of regulation and have developed largely independently of each other, they exhibit a generally unacknowledged and extensive overlap in their theoretical structure and associated results. In this article, we compare these two approaches to regulatory politics. For each, we discuss how the interactions of key actors are conceptualized, consider the types of regulatory mechanisms used to manage behavior, and examine the breadth of outcomes that flow from these controls. We suggest that greater acknowledgment of the commonalities in the two approaches can advance each approach, even if they continue to be pursued separately, and can also help generate important synthetic avenues for further research
Compliance (psychology · Control (management · Corporate governance · Economics · Historical institutionalism · Institutionalism · Law and economics · Management · New institutionalism · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Process (computing · Scholarship · Sociology · Computer Science · Global trade, sustainability, and social impact · Law · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Social Psychology · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses
Political and Organizational Influences in the Side Effects of FDA Approved Drugs
NGOs As Regulatory Intermediaries
The challenge of GI mainstreaming within market-led planning and development systems
The challenges in protecting public health interests in multisectoral governance in the context of small island developing states
Administrative Burden
Expertise and Power
Next-Generation Environmental Regulation
When opportunity backfires
Failed Governance
Only the intervenor cared”
The Politicization Conversation
Weak by design
Designing intermediary-involved regulatory system
The politics of regulatory design
Managing in the Regulatory Thicket
Governance capacity and regulatory enforcement
The Myths and Realities of Deterrence in Workplace Safety Regulation
Incredibly Committed? Assessing Regulatory Agency Financial Autonomy in Brazil From a Critical Perspective
Disguised Protectionism and Linkages to the Gatt/WTO
Governing complex societal problems
Politicians, regulators, and regulatory governance
What's wrong with the back of the envelope? A call for simple (and timely) benefit–cost analysis
Stakeholder involvement in collaborative regulatory processes
The challenge of accountability in complex regulatory networks
Pursuing Consilience
Flying in Clear Skies
Risco de captura por assimetria de informação na Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis
Análisis institucional multiagente
Da Hegemonia Sanitarista ao Predomínio Liberal
Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies
Mining disaster in the Doce River
Going by the book
Fluctuating fortunes
Corporate Environmentalism and Public Policy
Regulating Business by Independent Commission
Power without Persuasion
What Motivates Bureaucrats?
The Voluntary Environmentalists
Railroads and Regulations, 1877-1916
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy
Smart Regulation
Responsive Regulation
Regulation and Its Reform
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process
The Effect of Information on Product Quality
The Politics of Government Decision-Making
Presidents and the Politics of Structure
EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program
The Marasmus of the ICC
Presidential Administration
Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda
The Theory of Economic Regulation
The Logic of Collective Action
New Tools for Environmental Protection
Are management‐based regulations effective? Evidence from state pollution prevention programs
Regulating America, Regulating Sweden
The congressional-bureaucratic system
Congress, The Electoral Connection
Reforming Environmental Law
Congress
Going by the Book
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission
The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals
Agencies by Presidential Design
Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures
Compliance costs, regulation, and environmental performance
Regulatory regimes and accountability
Divided government and US federal rulemaking
What do we really know? The effect of reporting thresholds on inferences using environmental right‐to‐know data
The Market for Virtue
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance
Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance
Principled Agents
Designing State Clean Air Agencies
Speed Bumps and Roadblocks
Political Influence on the Bureaucracy
The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy
Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion
Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power
Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality
A Formal Model of the Politics of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Market‐Oriented Regulation of Environmental Problems in the Netherlands
Development of Communitarian Regulation in the Chemical Industry
Constructing the License to Operate
Environment, Self‐Regulation, and the Chemical Industry
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism
Management-Based Regulation
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
Protection without Capture
Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement
Compliance Motivations
Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence
What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading
The New Institutionalism
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence
Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power
Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness
Political Control Versus Expertise
Setting Safety Standards
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
| Unique citing works | 31 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,21 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 30 |