Rationalising parliamentary systems
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6234819 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Geoffrey Brennan (0000-0003-2045-757X), Geoffrey H Brennan (0000-0002-7220-3304), Alan Hamlin (0000-0001-5403-5733) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 443-457 |
| Publication date | 1993-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1036-1146 • E-ISSN: 1363-030X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00323269308402253 |
| OpenAlex | W2079039450 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 19 |
Public Choice analysis of democratic political institutions focuses on the issues that are most salient under US constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary systems offer different institutional arrangements and different challenges to the Public Choice approach. We outline a Public Choice account of parliamentary democracy which concentrates attention on the roles of electoral competition and disciplined political parties, while also offering a discussion of parliamentary procedure. The Public Choice approach is contrasted with the mainstream view of representative, responsible government in which disciplined political parties are often seen as a threat to parliamentary democracy
Competition (biology · Democracy · Government (linguistics · Mainstream · Political science · Politics · Salient · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration
Democracy and Decision
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
An economic theory of democracy
Foundations of social choice theory
The Calculus of Consent
The Logic of Party Democracy
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
The Logic of Party Democracy, by Alan Ware
Constitutional stability
Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting
The positive theory of legislative institutions
Bicameralism and majoritarian equilibrium
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
Concepts of Political Parties
A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
The Core of the Constitution
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,16 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2007 (14) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |