From connection to collusion

How college admissions bow to powerful alumni in China

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6265123
AutoresTao Li (0000-0001-7895-4136, University of Macau), Kun Mo (University of Macau)
Ano2022
Volume35
Fascículo1
Páginas25-42
Data de publicação2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoGovernance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12555
OpenAlexW3115558928
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas21

Access to college is critical for social mobility in China. Using a detailed college admission database that includes essentially all four‐year public universities from 2005 to 2013, we demonstrate that Chinese universities preallocate more admission seats to provinces that happen to fall under the leadership of their alumni. Moreover, we demonstrate that the identified admission favoritism constitutes a political exchange between public universities and their powerful alumni in the sense that (a) universities and the connected provinces tend to sign formal partnership agreements; and (b) university leaders who sign formal partnership agreements receive indirect personal gains in terms of career advancement in the party‐state bureaucracy. Our article provides causal evidence that social connections facilitate powerful government insiders' collusion and capture of public resources in a weak institutional environment

Bureaucracy · Business · China · Collusion · General partnership · Government (linguistics · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Sign (mathematics · State (computer science · China's Ethnic Minorities and Relations · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics · Law · Public Administration