International Organizations as Policy Advisors
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6269983 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Songying Fang (0000-0002-3306-6415, Rice University), Randall W Stone (0000-0002-2453-8708, University of Rochester) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 537-569 |
| Publication date | 2012-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0020818312000276 |
| OpenAlex | W2096716288 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 32 |
| References cited | 40 |
How can international organizations persuade governments to adopt policy recommendations that are based on private information when their interests conflict? We develop a game-theoretic model of persuasion that applies regardless of regime type and does not rely on the existence of domestic constituency constraints. In the model, an international organization (IO) and a domestic expert have private information about a crisis, but their preferences diverge from those of the government, which must choose whether to delegate decision making to the expert. Persuasion can take place if the international institution is able to send a credible signal. We find that this can take place only if the preferences of the IO and the domestic expert diverge and the institution holds the more moderate policy position. This result contrasts with conventional wisdom, which holds that the necessary condition for IOs to exert influence is support from a domestic constituency with aligned preferences. Our model suggests that, far from being an obstacle to international cooperation, polarized domestic politics may be a necessary condition for IOs to exert effective influence
Business · Cheap talk · Computer security · CONTEST · Delegate · Economics · Government (linguistics · Institution · International relations · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Obstacle · Persuasion · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Private information retrieval · Public relations · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Policies and Impacts · Finance · International Development and Aid · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
“The silent revolution
Informal governance in international organizations
Violencia electoral en México
The influence of civil society on Ukrainian anti-corruption policy after the Maidan
International Cooperation, Information Transmission, and Delegation
Which Wheel Gets the Grease? Constituent Agency and Sub-national World Bank Aid Allocation
Conserving What’s Left
Can Trust in Climate-Skeptical Governments Inhibit Pro-Environmental Action? Implications for Public Participation and Democratic Innovations
Human rights treaty derogation and Covid-19
Ending Economic Sanctions in the Shadow of Bargaining Problems
Compliance with International Norms
Reconceptualising burdens – Nato centres of excellence
Rethinking Tests of the IO Effectiveness Hypothesis
The Challenges and Efficacy of International Organizations in the Context of Russia’s War in Ukraine
Professional ties that bind
The IMF as a global monitor
How does policy advice of the international monetary fund differ along the income of advised countries
Empowered by Information
IO Endorsements, Perceived Alignment, and Public Support for Unpopular Policies
Policy recommendations of international bureaucracies
International-domestic linkages in a developing-country context
The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
Why National Ministries Consider the Policy Advice of International Bureaucracies
Can “Soft” Advice from International Organizations Catalyze Natural Resource Sector Reform
Back to Basics
The politics of external approval
Patterns of international organizations’ engagement in reform and policy making in the post-Soviet space
Formal Models of International Institutions
Mixed Signals
Bad science
Packaging OECD policy advice
Silent Revolution
Who elected the bankers?
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
The European Union Decides
Lending Credibility
International Institutions and National Policies
Ideas and International Political Change
Controlling Institutions
The IMF and Economic Development
Strategic Information Transmission
“The silent revolution
Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions
Interests, Institutions, and Information
Rules for the World
After Hegemony
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
Ideas and Foreign Policy
Sars, Governance and the Globalization of Disease
Mobilizing for Human Rights
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Argentina and the Fund
The Value of Biased Information
Discretion Rather than Rules
Adjudication without Enforcement in Gatt Disputes
A Servant of Two Masters
Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets
Rationalist explanations for war
Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy
Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism
Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation
The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics
Ideas & Foreign Policy
| Unique citing works | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,29 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 32 |