Only Here to Help? Bargaining and the Perverse Incentives of International Institutions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6272957 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Spaniel (0000-0002-6733-385X, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 14-22 |
| Publication date | 2018-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqx064 |
| OpenAlex | W2782738156 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 57 |
Many international organizations reduce the costs states incur from conflict. Critics argue that the expectation of such aid, by mitigating potential suffering, perversely incentivizes states to initiate conflict more often. I develop a model that formalizes this intuition. It shows that institutions may still ameliorate suffering in two ways. First, they may absorb so many of the expected costs that they compensate for the fact that conflicts occur more often. Second, aid can have a second-order effect of reducing uncertainty about the costs of conflict; to the extent that this uncertainty explains why parties cannot negotiate a cooperative alternative, aid might actually reduce the incentive to initiate conflict. Whether aid ultimately helps or hurts therefore depends on how it interacts with the informational challenges states face
Business · Economics · Incentive · International conflict · Intuition · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Order (exchange · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Finance · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
Intervention, war expansion, and the international sources of civil war
The Mercurial Commitment
Do Major-Power Interventions Encourage the Onset of Civil Conflict? A Structural Analysis
Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war
Less Is More? Shifting Power and Third-Party Military Assistance
The Uncertainty Trade-off
In the Shadow of Power
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Order within Anarchy
Civil Wars and Foreign Powers
Military Threats
Controlling Institutions
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy
Statements of Resolve
Reputation and Civil War
Aiding Victims, Abetting Violence
Suicidal rebellions and the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention
Third-party intervention and escalation in Kosovo
Illusions of moral hazard
Arms Negotiation, War Exhaustion, and the Credibility of Preventive War
Designing Transitions from Civil War
The impact of economic sanctions on health and human rights in Haiti, 1991-1994
Permissive action links
Toward a Comprehensive Safeguards System
Preventing Civil War
Interstate Peacekeeping
Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace
International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining
Adjudication without Enforcement in Gatt Disputes
Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts
Third-party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts
The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention
Fostering Peace After Civil War
Does Private Information Lead to Delay or War in Crisis Bargaining
Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention
Assisting Uncertainty
Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions
Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes
Rationalist explanations for war
A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War
Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Situation Structure and Institutional Design
Bargaining Failures and Civil War
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
The Road to Hell? Third‐Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities
The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining
The United Nations Security Council and the Rally 'Round the Flag Effect
Economic sanctions
Give War a Chance
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
International Peacebuilding
Information, Power, and War
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,86 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |