Less Is More? Shifting Power and Third-Party Military Assistance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284057 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Spaniel (0000-0002-6733-385X, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author), Burcu Savun (0000-0001-5932-0592, University of Pittsburgh) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 7-8 |
| Pages | 1332-1357 |
| Publication date | 2024-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027231202797 |
| OpenAlex | W4386880861 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 45 |
In contexts as diverse as civil war interventions, alliances, and military coalitions, states often militarily assist protégés to counteract unfavorable power shifts. Existing theoretical work finds that such assistance mitigates commitment problems and reduces the probability of war. We develop a model that captures this but also includes information asymmetries. In many cases, overcoming the commitment problem encourages the protégé to take greater risks in bargaining, thereby increasing the probability of war due to incomplete information. Using mechanism design, we show that in some cases, no feasible transfer can reduce the probability of war to zero. More broadly, our results indicate that encouraging policymakers to further expand military assistance can backfire despite empirical relationships that may appear otherwise
Complete information · Computer security · Economics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Psychological intervention · Spanish Civil War · Work (physics · Zero (linguistics · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Engineering · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
Does Peacekeeping Work?
Econometric policy evaluation
Constructing International Security
CHAPTER Five Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict
Reputation and Civil War
Power in Peacekeeping
Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
Current and Potential Capacity for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities within the United Nations System
United Nations peacekeeping dynamics and the duration of post-civil conflict peace
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Designing Transitions from Civil War
Committing to Peace
Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War
Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918-1988
External Subsidies and Lasting Peace
The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention
Alliance Dynamics in the Shadow of Shifting Power
Third-Party Intervention and the Escalation of State-Minority Conflicts1
The Uncertainty Trade-off
Arms, Intelligence, and War
Altering Capabilities or Imposing Costs? Intervention Strategy and Civil War Outcomes
Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention
Only Here to Help? Bargaining and the Perverse Incentives of International Institutions
Making and Keeping Peace
Rationalist explanations for war
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
War as a Commitment Problem
External Intervention, Identity, and Civil War
How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals
Bargaining Failures and Civil War
A Model of Spoils Politics
Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements
The Turnover Trap
The Road to Hell? Third‐Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining
Where, when, and how does the UN work to prevent civil war in self-determination disputes
Taking Sides in Wars of Attrition
Beyond Keeping Peace
Information, Power, and War
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |