Stealing an Election
Violence or Fraud
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283271 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dawn Brancati (0000-0003-0392-7154, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA), Elizabeth Maggie Penn (0000-0002-2018-4367, Emory University) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 858-892 |
| Publication date | 2023-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027221120595 |
| OpenAlex | W4296785195 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 35 |
Political actors often resort to electoral violence to gain an edge over their competitors even though violence is harder to hide than fraud and more likely to delegitimize elections as a result. Existing explanations tend to analyze violence in terms of the same factors as fraud, or to treat violence as a means of last resorts given its overtness. We introduce a novel explanation that does neither, arguing that political actors often use violence for the very reason that it is hard to hide. Its overtness, we argue, allows political actors to observe whether the agents they enlist to manipulate elections for them do so and reduces these agents’ likelihood of shirking in turn. We develop our argument through a formal model showing that electoral monitors, by exacerbating problems of moral hazard (shirking), can induce actors to increasingly turn to violence and use process tracing to examine the implications of this model through the example of Egypt
Argument (complex analysis · Competitor analysis · Criminology · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political economy · Political science · Political violence · Politics · Process (computing · Process tracing · Sociology · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America
Judges and Political Reform in Egypt
Counting Islam
The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma
Democracy and the re-consolidation of authoritarian rule in Egypt
Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution
Egypt'S 1995 Elections
An unwilling client
Rigging elections with violence
Fighting for Votes
Votes and Violence
The Observer Effect in International Politics
The Agency Problem Underlying Repression
Third-Party Actors and the Success of Democracy
Bullets over ballots
Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control
The Election Monitor's Curse
When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence
Surviving Elections
Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa
Electoralfraud
Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt
Perils of pluralism
Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns
All quiet on election day? International election observation and incentives for pre-election violence in African elections
Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies
The cost of exposing cheating
Preventive Repression
Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud
Perverse Accountability
The Political Violence Cycle
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |