Fighting for Votes
Theory and Evidence on the Causes of Electoral Violence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9728264 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Olivier Sterck (0000-0003-3835-9388, University of Oxford, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 347 |
| Pages | 844-883 |
| Publication date | 2020-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12321 |
| OpenAlex | W2263197493 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 70 |
I develop a theory of pre‐electoral violence, in which parties resort to violent tactics if political competition is tight and violent supporters are numerous, and if polarization between violent supporters is high. The importance of these conditions varies with the type of violence (clashes, intimidation or murders). I test the model using data on the 2010 elections in Burundi. In line with the model, electoral violence before the election was more likely in municipalities characterized by both close political competition and high density of demobilized combatants. Violence was also more likely where polarization between demobilized combatants was high
Competition (biology) · Criminology · Intimidation · Polarization (electrochemistry) · Political science · Political violence · Politics · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Revisiting Electoral Violence in Zimbabwe
Challenges and Hurdles Regarding Free and Fair Elections in India
Kinship ties and female political participation
I feared for my life”
The political economy of group domination and pre-electoral violence
When armed groups refuse to carry out election violence
Stealing an Election
Renting political violence
Negative Binomial Regression
Self-Enforcing Democracy
Political Competition, Policy and Growth
Conflict and Distribution
Does Terrorism Work?
Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization
On the Practice of Lagging Variables to Avoid Simultaneity
War and local collective action in Sierra Leone
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Ethnicity and Conflict
The Global Distribution of Economic Activity
The Monopoly of Violence
Africa's Growth Tragedy
GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence
The political economy of government responsiveness
The Logic of Political Violence
Greed and grievance in civil war
Electoral Accountability and Corruption
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability
Proxy Variables and Specification Bias
War and Relatedness
History Matters
Mismeasured Variables in Econometric Analysis
Voting intentions in Africa
Galton’s Problem and Contagion in International Terrorism along Civilizational Lines
Triggers and Characteristics of the 2007 Kenyan Electoral Violence
The (hidden) costs of political instability
Ethnic diversity and economic development
Political violence and social networks
Dying to win
Bullets for Ballots
Rigging elections with violence
Violence, bribery, and fraud
Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables
The Profits of Power
Votes and Violence
The Observer Effect in International Politics
Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana
How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections
Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict
Electing Displacement
Reintegrating Rebels into Civilian Life
On the Nature of First Democratic Elections
When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia
Ethnopolitical demography and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa
Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
Surviving Elections
The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa
Timing and targeting of state repression in authoritarian elections
From Rebellion to Electoral Violence
Power-sharing as a fragile safety valve in times of electoral turmoil
Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict
The cost of exposing cheating
Crime Victimization and Political Participation
Modeling Negative Campaigning
Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State
From Violence to Voting
Terrorism and Voting
Genocide in the Great Lakes
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |