From Cooptation to Violence
Managing Competitive Authoritarian Elections
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071598 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed (0000-0003-0143-337X, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 731-760 |
| Publication date | 2024-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027241267209 |
| OpenAlex | W4401277752 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 45 |
Autocratic elections are often marred with systematic intimidation and violence towards voters and candidates. When do authoritarian regimes resort to violent electoral strategies? I argue that electoral violence acts as a risk-management strategy in competitive authoritarian elections where: (a) the regime’s prospects for coopting local elites, competitors, and voters are weak, and (b) the expected political cost of electoral violence is low. I test these propositions by explaining the subnational distribution of electoral violence during the most violent election in Mubarak’s Egypt (1981–2011): the 2005 Parliamentary Election. The results indicate that electoral violence is higher in districts where: the regime has a lower capacity for coopting local elites, it faces competition from ideological (rather than rent-seeking) challengers with no cooptation potential, clientelistic strategies are costlier and less effective, and citizens' capacity for non-electoral mobilization is low. The conclusions provide lessons for containing electoral manipulation and violence in less democratic contexts
Authoritarianism · Autocracy · Competition (biology · Competitor analysis · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Electoral geography · Ideology · Intimidation · Political economy · Political science · Political violence · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Society in Latin America
Voting for Autocracy
Making Sense of Sensitivity
Regression-based tests for overdispersion in the Poisson model
Votes and Violence
Classless Politics
Counting Islam
From Open Secrets to Secret Voting
States, the security sector, and the monopoly of violence
Electoral Violence, Corruption, and Political Order
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
Competitive Authoritarianism
Elite Competition, Social Movements, and Election Violence in Nigeria
Rigging elections with violence
Violence, bribery, and fraud
Elections and Social Conflict in Africa, 1990–2009
Votes and Violence
Autocratic Elections
Dangerous Disconnect
Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions
Elections Without Democracy
An Inquiry into the Use of Illegal Electoral Practices and Effects of Political Violence and Vote-buying
Stealing an Election
From Sticks to Carrots
Regional protest and electoral fraud
Elections under authoritarianism
Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities
Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
The Real Winner's Curse
The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule
Hitting Them With Carrots
Electoral Fraud or Violence
When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence
Mere Description
Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa
Violence and Democracy
Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa
Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt
Perils of pluralism
Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns
Electoral violence
From a perpetrator's perspective
Intimidating voters with violence and mobilizing them with clientelism
Carrots and sticks
The cost of exposing cheating
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |