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Practicing Coercion

Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and Comparative Methods

Bibliographic Data

ID6283774
AuthorsFrank P Harvey (Dalhousie University, corresponding author)
Year1999
Volume43
Issue6
Pages840-871
Publication date1999-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002799043006008
OpenAlexW1979443076
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited34

When do coercive threats succeed or fail? Does success depend on a uniform set of necessary conditions or do core prerequisites vary depending on context? If prerequisites vary, are some combinations more likely than others to lead to success or provoke challenges? The evidence to date is far from definitive. Critics cite proof from comparative case studies that rational deterrence has failed as a strategy and theory, whereas proponents have compiled an equally impressive body of material to support the same theory. Because each side offers compelling reasons to accept its respective, often contradictory, interpretations of events in relevant crises, the debate over deterrence is not likely to be resolved solely with reference to historical records. This article reevaluates the “crucial” evidence put forward by Lebow and Stein in what has become the most widely cited critique of rational deterrence theory. Viewed through the prism of necessity and sufficiency, their data produce stronger support for the theory's core hypotheses than corresponding evidence compiled by proponents. The author develops this argument further by applying Boolean logic and set theory to data compiled by Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. Boolean minimization techniques are used to derive models from competing interpretations of behavior in these cases, which are then compared and evaluated in terms of the theory's predictions

Argument (complex analysis · Coercion (linguistics · Context (archaeology · Core (optical fiber · Deterrence theory · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · History · Law · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research

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Unique citing works11
Citations per year0,5
Citation span2004 - 2025 (22)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 11

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