Practicing Coercion
Revisiting Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and Comparative Methods
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283774 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Frank P Harvey (Dalhousie University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 840-871 |
| Publication date | 1999-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002799043006008 |
| OpenAlex | W1979443076 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 34 |
When do coercive threats succeed or fail? Does success depend on a uniform set of necessary conditions or do core prerequisites vary depending on context? If prerequisites vary, are some combinations more likely than others to lead to success or provoke challenges? The evidence to date is far from definitive. Critics cite proof from comparative case studies that rational deterrence has failed as a strategy and theory, whereas proponents have compiled an equally impressive body of material to support the same theory. Because each side offers compelling reasons to accept its respective, often contradictory, interpretations of events in relevant crises, the debate over deterrence is not likely to be resolved solely with reference to historical records. This article reevaluates the “crucial” evidence put forward by Lebow and Stein in what has become the most widely cited critique of rational deterrence theory. Viewed through the prism of necessity and sufficiency, their data produce stronger support for the theory's core hypotheses than corresponding evidence compiled by proponents. The author develops this argument further by applying Boolean logic and set theory to data compiled by Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. Boolean minimization techniques are used to derive models from competing interpretations of behavior in these cases, which are then compared and evaluated in terms of the theory's predictions
Argument (complex analysis · Coercion (linguistics · Context (archaeology · Core (optical fiber · Deterrence theory · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Computer Science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · History · Law · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research
Computational International Relations What Can Programming, Coding and Internet Research Do for the Discipline
Lessons from the Mena region
Getting Nato's Success in Kosovo Right
Deterring the Undeterrable
Lessons in deterrence
Understanding the ‘War on Terrorism’
Lack of Resolve or Military Infeasibility? Explaining Reduced Punishments during the 1936 Rhineland Crisis and the 2010 Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island
A Tale of Two Cultures
Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory
Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy
Fighting for Credibility
Psychology and Deterrence
Optimal Deterrence
Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
The Comparative Method
The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate
Classical deterrence theory
Beyond Deterrence
Do We Want a Better Theory of Deterrence
Deterrence
Rational Deterrence
Deterrence Theory Revisited
Testing Deterrence Theory
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies
Deterrence and Foreign Policy
Rational Deterrence Theory
Rationality and Deterrence
Opportunity, Willingness and Political Uncertainty
Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited
The calculus of deterrence
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
More calculations about deterrence
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study
The Methodology of Necessary Conditions
Deterrence and ethnic conflict
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability
| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |