Producing Goods and Projecting Power
How What You Make Influences What You Take
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284065 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan N Markowitz (0000-0001-7429-8397, University of Southern California, corresponding author), Jonathan Markowitz (0000-0002-0987-0761, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA), Christopher J Fari (0000-0001-9837-186X, University of Michigan), Christopher Fari, Christopher Fariss (Center for Political Studies (CPS), Institute for Social Research, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA), R Blake Mcmahon (0000-0002-6943-3520, Maxwell Air Force Base) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1368-1402 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002718789735 |
| OpenAlex | W2888096660 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 11 |
| References cited | 58 |
How does a state’s source of wealth condition the domain in which it seeks to project influence? We argue that what a state makes conditions what they take. Specifically, the less states rely on land rents to acquire wealth, the less interested they will be in seeking control over territory and the more interested they will be in securing access to distant markets. We develop and test several observable implications that should follow whether this proposition is true. First, as states become less economically dependent on territory, they should be less likely to fight over territory; second, those states should be more likely to both invest in power projection capabilities and subsequently project power at greater distances. Our findings support our theory. These results are robust across a variety of model specifications that take into account potential confounds, such as regime type, economic development, threat, and geography
Business · Economics · Industrial organization · Power (physics · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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Midloc
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| Unique citing works | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 11 |