Some theoretic characteristics of economic and political coalitions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284404 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John G Cro, John G Cross (University of Michigan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1967 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 184-195 |
| Publication date | 1967-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200276701100205 |
| OpenAlex | W2022513806 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 3 |
Economic system · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Economic theories and models · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Political Economy and Marxism
On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions
Characterization results for aspirations in games with sidepayments
Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games
Interval measures of power
Political coalition bargaining behaviour
Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,12 |
| Citation span | 1975 - 2022 (48) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |