Components of an operational theory of international alliance formation

Bibliographic Data

ID6284574
AuthorsBruce Russett (Yale University, corresponding author), Bruce M Russett (Yale University)
Year1968
Volume12
Issue3
Pages285-301
Publication date1968-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/002200276801200302
OpenAlexW2038185570
LanguageEN
Citations received30
References cited26

Explaining or predicting patterns of alliance among nations has long been a central concern in the study of international politics and organization. There is, however, no satisfactory theory to indicate what nations will ally with what others in the system. This article is intended to outline an approach to the construction of such a comprehensive theory, suggesting some of the definitions and propositions that would be central to the effort, as well as some of the research obstacles that would be faced. First, we shall indicate the context of the problem: (1) There are three or more nations. (2) The situation is at least partly competitive; i.e., there is no single outcome that will maximize the gains of each of the participants. (3) No single nation is either in a dominant position-it can win without allying itself with any other nation-or in a position of potential veto-it must be included in any winning coalition. (4) There is the possibility of a decision

Alliance · Business · Economics · International trade · Management science · Political science · Process management · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Game Theory and Applications · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub