Leaders, Advisers, and the Political Origins of Elite Support for War

Bibliographic Data

ID6284763
AuthorsElizabeth N Saunders (0000-0001-5350-0138, Center for Security Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume62
Issue10
Pages2118-2149
Publication date2018-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002718785670
OpenAlexW2897209370
LanguageEN
Citations received29
References cited53

As research on leaders matures, a next step is a better understanding of the advisers who surround them. This article explores the often-hidden politics of leader–adviser interactions, focusing on how leaders strategically manage elite cues from within their own circle that could engage otherwise dormant or permissive public opinion. Advisers can serve as cue givers when leaders contemplate the use of force, but leaders can shape which cues reach the public by accommodating advisers. This article explores this argument by combining a survey experiment with a case study of the 2009 escalation in Afghanistan, illustrating how the dynamics identified in the experiment motivate the president to bargain with advisers whose support or opposition would most influence public opinion. An important implication is that in the real world, damaging cues found in survey experiments may be diminished in volume or may not reach the public, whereas helpful cues could be magnified

Argument (complex analysis · Elite · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Public opinion · Public relations · Sociology · Survey data collection · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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