Arms Diffusion and War

Bibliographic Data

ID6285896
AuthorsMuhammet A Bas (Harvard University), Andrew J Coe (0000-0003-4986-1242, Harvard University)
Year2012
Volume56
Issue4
Pages651-674
Publication date2012-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002712445740
OpenAlexW2075326428
LanguageEN
Citations received28
References cited29

The authors present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military technologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power, causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asymmetric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will occur once one of them has it. The authors illustrate the model with historical examples from the spread of firearms (the Musket Wars in precolonial New Zealand) and of nuclear weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere

Balance (ability · Competition (biology · Development economics · Economics · Market economy · Monopoly · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Spanish Civil War · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Game Theory and Applications · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Psychology

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