When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285915 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian Bjørnskov (0000-0002-9765-913X, Aarhus University), Stefan Voigt (0000-0001-5564-3669, Universität Hamburg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 579-613 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002719865994 |
| OpenAlex | W2968729568 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 25 |
The relationship between terrorist activities and states of emergency has never been explored in a cross-country perspective. This article is a first step to change that. Given that a terror act has been committed, what are the factors that lead governments to declare a state of emergency (SOE)—or refrain from declaring it? And given that a SOE has been declared, what are the effects thereof? On the basis of seventy-nine countries all having Western-style constitutions, we find that more terrorist incidents increase the likelihood of a SOE. Interestingly, emergencies are less likely to be declared in election years, supposedly because governments believe them to be unpopular. Once a SOE is declared, it generally leads to substantially more government repression. Finally, countries already under a SOE are more likely to suffer from additional terror attacks, challenging the effectiveness of states of emergency
Business · Development economics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Perspective (graphical · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · State of emergency · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
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Is constitutionalized media freedom only window dressing? Evidence from terrorist attacks
Does Emergency Rule Help Counterinsurgents? Testing the Hearts and Minds Theories
Contracting for Catastrophe
Militant constitutionalism
Assessing the effect of international terrorism on civil liberties using a potential outcomes framework
Emergencies
Does Freedom of Expression Cause Less Terrorism
The conditions for reducing electoral violence through constitutional reform
Terrorism and emergency constitutions in the Muslim world
Rationalizing backsliding
Government Targeting of Refugees in the Midst of Epidemics
Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States
The Endurance of National Constitutions
Terrorism and electoral accountability
The Next Generation of the Penn World Table
The Political Economy of Terrorism
What Terrorists Really Want
Democracy and dictatorship revisited
Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism
Lock, stock, and barrel
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
The Partisan Politics of Counterterrorism
Measuring high level democratic principles using the V-Dem data
Emergency and Escape
Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism
The Rule of Law in the Fight against Terrorism
Domestic versus transnational terrorism
The analytical study of terrorism
The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies
Is There a Trade-off between Security and Liberty? Executive Bias, Privacy Protections, and Terrorism Prevention
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,5 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2025 (6) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |