Agency slack as cause of deviation in trilogue negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6289328 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thomas Laloux (0009-0004-0893-2192, Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique-FNRS - UCLouvain, Institut de sciences politiques Louvain-Europe, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 132-151 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of European Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1350-1763 • E-ISSN: 1466-4429 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13501763.2020.1859595 |
| OpenAlex | W3112274499 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 39 |
Trilogues are the main forum for legislative negotiation in the EU. In trilogues, each co-legislator is represented by negotiators, who therefore play a central role in the current EU legislative process. This paper examines whether trilogues enable negotiators therein to slack by deviating more from the mandates they receive when they disagree with their institutions. The extent of deviation is measured using text-mining techniques for 219 negotiations conducted between 2012 and 2018. As a main result, the analysis does not reveal evidence that deviation in trilogues is significantly linked to principal-agent disagreement, neither in the EP, nor in the Council. In other words, the extent of deviation in trilogues does not appear to be the result of negotiators defending positions that are not representative of those of their institutions. This result thus contributes allaying the normative concerns expressed regarding the non-representativity of trilogues compromises, and therefore of EU legislation
Agency (philosophy · Economics · Negotiation · Political science · Social science · Sociology · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration
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Theories Ofdelegation
Agency Theory
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,6 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |