Is Full Compliance Possible
Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6298488 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jenna Bednar (0000-0002-0840-3782, University of Michigan; Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, 426 Thompson St, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 347-375 |
| Publication date | 2006-07-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629806065012 |
| OpenAlex | W3124599340 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 41 |
Games of public good provision, collective action, and collusion share concern for the free rider that shirks on its obligations. According to the folk theorem, the free rider problem can be resolved through punishment mechanisms. Versions of the folk theorem have been applied when monitoring is imperfect. Empirical evidence contradicts this theory: while often subjects cooperate significantly, rarely is all shirking eliminated. To reconcile theory with empirical evidence, I provide a theoretical basis for the inability of participants in collective action problems to attain full compliance. I construct a general class of compliance models with imperfect monitoring through a common signal. I derive sufficient conditions — on both the utility of agents and the monitoring capabilities — under which slippage from full compliance is unavoidable, showing the limits of the folk theorem logic. The results cover most cases of concern to political scientists and political economists including public goods provision, contract and treaty compliance, collective action, and even Cournot competition. The article concludes with a discussion about institutional design
Action (physics · Collective action · Collusion · Competition (biology · Compliance (psychology · Construct (python library · Economics · Enforcement · Folk theorem · Game theory · Imperfect · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public good · Repeated game · Treaty · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Weak sovereignty and interstate war
Ending Economic Sanctions in the Shadow of Bargaining Problems
Federalism as a Public Good
The Political Science of Federalism
Nudging Federalism towards Productive Experimentation
Timely shirking
Valuing Exit Options
The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining
Dynamic Elite Partisanship
When Do States Follow the Laws of War
Governing the Commons
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Public Goods
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Governing the Commons
The evolution of cooperation
The Logic of Collective Action
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
Alliances versus Federations
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement
The cumulation of incompetence in organizations
Global Communications and National Power
Judicial Predictability and Federal Stability
The “Spite” Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions
The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
On compliance
Modeling the forms of international cooperation
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Coping With Tragedies of the Commons
Trust and Taxpaying
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Covenants with and without a Sword
Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action
Explaining Interethnic Cooperation
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
International Law and State Behavior
| Citations per year | 0.48 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2005 - 2024 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |