A strategic theory of effective monitoring arrangements for international institutions

Bibliographic Data

ID6299194
AuthorsThania Sanchez (Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA), Johannes Urpelainen (Columbia University, New York, NY, USA)
Year2014
Volume26
Issue4
Pages599-628
Publication date2014-10-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951629813511550
OpenAlexW1976516754
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited29

States often delegate compliance monitoring to international monitors. It is commomly assumed that these monitors will report accurately on the information they gather. However, the effectiveness of compliance monitors varies widely. Monitors may fail to collect information about non-compliance or even collude with non-compliant states and deliberately fail to report the information they gather. To explain this variation, we present a formal theory of how structural conditions and institutional designs lead to different levels of monitoring efficacy. We show that international institutions can improve monitoring by avoiding ruthless sanctions, and that intrinsically motivated monitors generally achieve better outcomes than neutral bureaucrats. Our theory contributes to the broad literature on international institutional design and treaty effectiveness

Business · Compliance (psychology · Delegate · Economics · International relations · International relations theory · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Treaty · Computer Science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

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