A Spatial Model of Competitive Bidding for Government Grants
Why Efficiency Gains Are Limited
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6299475 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hugh Ward (University of Essex), Peter John (0000-0002-7934-1187, University of Manchester, Peter.John@ manchester.ac.uk) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 47-66 |
| Publication date | 2008-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629807084039 |
| OpenAlex | W2101102662 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 18 |
With a view to improving public sector efficiency many governments now make public sector bodies competitively bid for funding. We model the bidding process as a game of spatial competition. Using Monte Carlo simulations we show that in efficient equilibria many bidding groups will not be under competitive pressure. The model suggests that this is because their ideal projects are inherently valuable for the funding agency and other groups cannot match this without departing so far from their ideal that they would rather not be successful. We test the hypothesis that competition will be limited largely to groups whose preferred projects are of medium quality on data from the UK Single Regeneration Budget. Using resubmitted bids to track the impact of competition, we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis
Agency (philosophy · Bidding · Competition (biology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ideal (ethics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Process (computing · Public economics · Quality (philosophy · Track (disk drive · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Housing Market and Economics
Public Services and Market Mechanisms
Contracting out by the public sector
Quasi-Markets and Social Policy
Contract Budgeting
From‐Long Term To Short‐Term Contracting
Between Whitehall and Town Hall
The Unintended Effects of Private School Competition
How Competitive Is Competitive Bidding? The Case of the Single Regeneration Budget Program
The Bidding Game
Coalitions in Urban Regeneration
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |