When Are Local Incumbents Held Accountable for Government Performance? Evidence from US School Districts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300591 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Julia A Payson (0000-0003-0846-3213, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 421-448 |
| Publication date | 2017-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12159 |
| OpenAlex | W2556768316 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 34 |
Do voters hold local officials accountable for government performance? Using over a decade of panel data on school district elections and academic achievement in California, I causally identify the effect of test score changes on school board incumbent re‐election rates and show that incumbents are more likely to win re‐election when test scores improve in their districts—but only in presidential election years. This effect disappears in midterm and off‐years, indicating that election timing might facilitate local government accountability
Accountability · Demographic economics · Econometrics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Local election · Local government · Panel data · Political science · Politics · Presidential election · Presidential system · Test (biology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Public Administration · School Choice and Performance
Election Timing and Local Political Polarization
Alphabet Soup
Teachers’ unions and school board elections
Tabling Debate
Political Budget Cycles in Public Education
The politics of teachers' union endorsements
Who wins when? Election timing and descriptive representation
Are retrospective evaluations of local governments moderated by perceptions of influence
Does the Meeting Style Matter? The Effects of Exposure to Participatory and Deliberative School Board Meetings
Partisanship and Professionalization
Avoiding Punishment? Electoral Accountability for Local Fee Increases
Inequality in the Classroom
Off-Cycle and Out of Sync
Local Elections and Representation in the United States
Party and Ideology in American Local Government
The New Education Politics in the United States
Election Timing, Electorate Composition, and Policy Outcomes
There's (rarely) a new sheriff in town
Motivated Reasoning and Democratic Accountability
Local News and the Electoral Incentive to Invest in Infrastructure
The Responsible Electorate
Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models
Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale Democracy
Political Control and the Power of the Agent
Do Better Schools Matter? Parental Valuation of Elementary Education
Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians
Irrelevant events affect voters' evaluations of government performance
How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence from Project Star
Some heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators with improved finite sample properties
Using Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors in the Linear Regression Model
Elections and Representation
Political Control of the Economy
Election Timing and Public Policy
The Election Timing Effect
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups
Accountability and Local Elections
Should I Use Fixed or Random Effects
All Politics Is Local
Public information, public learning and public opinion
Electoral Accountability
Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Holding Mayors Accountable
Bankers or peasants revisited
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy
Vote Choice in Suburban Elections
Left Behind? Citizen Responsiveness to Government Performance Information
| Unique citing works | 20 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,5 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |