Veto Players Revisited
Internal and External Factors Influencing Policy Production
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300951 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Karleen Jones West (0000-0002-6138-025X, SUNY Geneseo), Hoon Lee (0000-0002-0549-5028, Texas Tech University) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 227-260 |
| Publication date | 2014-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/lsq.12043 |
| OpenAlex | W1594923480 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 87 |
Veto player models generally rely on two assumptions: (1) collective actors like political parties behave as individual actors; and (2) all actors influencing policy production are domestic. Yet these are often violated by empirical reality. Under certain institutions, parties are less cohesive and may not behave as individuals, and international regimes can have considerable influence over legislation. Using data on labor‐law production in Europe, we find that the effects of veto players are conditional on both party cohesion and international regimes. Future conceptualizations of veto players should be more sensitive to both internal and external institutional configurations
Cohesion (chemistry · Collective action · Economic system · Economics · Law and economics · Legislation · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Production (economics · Veto · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies
The Interaction Effects of Bargaining Power
Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe
Compulsory voting, economic conditions and turnout
The Empirical Uses of Theoretical Models
The classification of electoral systems
State Bureaucracy and the Management of Climate Change Adaptation in Bangladesh
Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation
The Personal Vote
How International Law Works
Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics
International Institutions and National Policies
The IMF and Economic Development
A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law
Veto Players
Interests, Institutions, and Information
After Hegemony
Adjusting to Europe
Activists beyond Borders
Internationalization and Domestic Politics
Theories of International Regimes
Democratic Commitments
Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government
Mobilizing for Human Rights
Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review
International regimes
Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior
The Personal Vote
Conforming to Europe
Structural causes and regime consequences
International cooperation and institutional choice
Negotiating the Single European Act
Implementing Europe
Worlds of compliance
The European parliament and environmental legislation
Power to the Parties
Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag
Activists beyond borders
Veto Players and Electoral Reform in Belgium
Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies
Testing the ‘Party Matters' Thesis
Making Rules about Rulemaking
Understanding Interaction Models
Ethnic inclusion and economic growth
Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada
Conclusion
Hierarchy, networks, or markets
Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights
Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions
International Regimes, Domestic Veto-Players, and Capital Controls Policy Stability
How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms
Coordination and collaboration
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Diplomacy and domestic politics
Trading Human Rights
Regime design matters
Institutions in International Relations
Invested interests
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court
Left–Right Political Scales
Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries
The Politics of Economic Stabilization
Globalization, Veto Players, and Welfare Spending
Incentives for Personal Votes and Women’s Representation in Legislatures
Treaty Compliance and Violation
Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany
Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries
Supplying Trade Reform
Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Policing the Bargain
International Institutions and Domestic Compensation
Decision Making in Political Systems
Theories of international regimes
Incentives to cultivate a personal vote
Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies
International Linkages and Environmental Sustainability
Remodeling the Competition for Capital
Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament
Contracting around International Uncertainty
International Law and State Behavior
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |