The Value of Majority Status
The Effect of Jeffords's Switch on Asset Prices of Republican and Democratic Firms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6301341 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chris Den Hartog (0000-0003-3030-4905, California Polytechnic State University), Nathan W Monroe (0000-0002-3355-7281, University of the Pacific) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 63-84 |
| Publication date | 2008-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298008783743291 |
| OpenAlex | W2011902149 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 47 |
Using the change in party control of the Senate that resulted from Jim Jeffords's 2001 change in party affiliation, we compare competing partisan and partyless legislative theories. We offer a reconceptualization of agenda control that provides a new and promising basis for studying parties and policymaking in the Senate. Also, we present a novel methodology—an “event study”—to test partisan and partyless hypotheses. Our results show that, when Jeffords switched, the stock prices of Republican‐supported energy firms dropped and prices for Democrat‐supported firms rose, supporting the hypothesis that the majority party influences Senate decisions
Asset (computer security · Control (management · Democracy · Economics · Event study · Legislature · Management · Political science · Politics · Stock (firearms · Test (biology · Value (mathematics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Accounting
The policy impact of unified government
The Jeffords switch and legislator rolls in the U.S. Senate
Different Houses
Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators
Party Power or Preferences? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from American State Legislatures
The Private Interests of Public Officials
Agreeing to Disagree
Divided Government and Congressional Investigations
Change in parliamentary party systems and policy outcomes
Executive Constraint, Political Stability, and Economic Growth
The Politics of Financialization in the United States, 1949–2005
Setting the Table
The Sound, the Fury, and the Nonevent
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Setting the Agenda
Information and Legislative Organization
Partners and Rivals
Minority Rights, Majority Rule
The Transformation of the U.S. Senate
Using daily stock returns
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Event Studies in Management Research
Bureaucrats Versus Voters
The logic of delegation
Pivotal Politics
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes
Committee Assignments in the U. S. Senate
Ambition in the House
Unorthodox lawmaking
Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism
Congressional Party Defection in American History
Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress
Unanimous Consent Agreements as Leadership Tools
The Statistical Analysis Of Roll‐Call Data
Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty
The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
Political Institutions, Policy Expectations, and the 1980 Election
A Dead Senator Tells No Lies
Severing the Electoral Connection
When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics
An Informational Rationale for Political Parties
Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes
Fighting Fire With Water
Lame-Duck Legislators and Consideration of the Ship Subsidy Bill of 1922
Partisanship, Consensus, and Committee-Floor Divergence
Institutional Context and Leadership Style
The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data
The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,68 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2021 (15) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |