Parties as Procedural Coalitions in Congress
An Examination of Differing Career Tracks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300992 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J A Jenkins (0000-0001-7426-3370, Northwestern University), Michael H Crespin (0000-0002-8137-6776, Michigan State University), Jamie L Carson (0000-0002-0083-5206, University of Georgia) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 365-389 |
| Publication date | 2005-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298005x201590 |
| OpenAlex | W2120587776 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 48 |
We examine the degree to which parties act as procedural coalitions in Congress by testing predictions from the party cartel theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 1994, 2002). We gain leverage on the question of party influence in Congress by focusing on three types of House members: reelection seekers, higher-office seekers, and retiring members. We argue that retiring House members are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means (when compared to higher-office seekers and reelection seekers) to determine the existence of party influence. Results from a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of the 94th through 105th Congresses (1975–98) suggest that party influence is indeed present in Congress, especially where the party cartel theory predicts: on procedural, rather than final-passage, votes. Moreover, we find that procedural party influence is almost exclusively the domain of the majority party. This latter finding is especially important because most prior studies have been limited to investigating interparty influence only
Cartel · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Leverage (statistics · Microeconomics · Political science · Seekers · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Gender Politics and Representation · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Lawmaking
Party Polarization in Congress
Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis
Out of Step, Out of Party
Presidentialization and Procedural Rules Change
Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods
Ambition and Party Loyalty in the U.S. Senate
Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels
Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics
Uncertainty and Roll‐Call Voting in Lame‐Duck Sessions of the U . S . House, 1969–2010
Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st−108th Congresses
Partisanship, the Electoral Connection, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877–2006
Who Heeds the Call of the Party in Congress
Do Term Limits Affect Legislative Roll Call Voting? Representation, Polarization, and Participation
Consistency versus Responsiveness
Unpacking Agenda Control in Congress
Gender and Foreign Policy
The two faces of congressional roll-call voting
The Value of Majority Status
Gubernatorial Veto Powers and the Size of Legislative Coalitions
Leadership power, preference homogeneity, and legislative party conflict
Comparing Agenda Content and Roll-call Behaviour in Regular and Lame-duck Sessions of the House of Representatives, 1879–2010
Testing legislative shirking in a new setting
A Natural Experiment in Proposal Power and Electoral Success
Party Government and the “Cohesive Power of Public Plunder
The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress
Ethics and the Party Brand
The State and the Emergence of the First American Party System
The American Congress
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew
Why Parties?
Minority Rights, Majority Rule
Estimating Regression Models with Multiplicative Heteroscedasticity
Political Polarization and Income Inequality
Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000
Agenda Setting in the U. S. House
Party Government in the House Reconsidered
Ideology, ?shirking?, and representation
Changing minds? Not in Congress
Sizing Up the Senate
Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party
Political Opportunity for Federal Appointment
Reply to “Shirking in the Contemporary Congress
Asymmetry in Party Influence
How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth
On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting
Ambition in the House
Unorthodox lawmaking
The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond
The Coefficient of Party Influence
Shirking in the Contemporary Congress
Interpreting the Coefficient of Party Influence
Paradoxes of Parties in Congress
Is There Life after Congress? Patterns and Determinants of Post-Congressional Careers
Congressional Party Defection in American History
The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions
House Members Who Become Senators
Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty
Controlling the Floor
Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship
Severing the Electoral Connection
Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes
Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Where's the Party
Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting
Conditions for Party Leadership
The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
Party Contributions and Party Unity
| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,47 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |