Reforming to Avoid Reform

Strategic Policy Substitution and the Reform Gap in Policing

Bibliographic Data

ID6323623
AuthorsYanilda González (0000-0001-7832-0758, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume21
Issue1
Pages59-77
Publication date2023-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePerspectives on Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1537-5927 • E-ISSN: 1541-0986
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s1537592722000135
OpenAlexW4221120371
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited50

Institutional reforms often diverge from substantive problems and societal demands that originally prompted reform, raising questions about democratic responsiveness. Such reform gaps are prevalent in policing, wherein some police forces improve capacity and performance, while extrajudicial violence persists. I argue that police evade pressure for reform through strategic policy substitution, pressuring politicians to replace reforms that threaten bureaucratic autonomy with favorable reforms that preserve it. I describe how police act as veto players, thwarting high-threat structural and oversight reforms demanded by advocates to address violence and corruption by enacting low-threat operational and marginal reforms. Drawing on evidence from Colombia and Brazil, I demonstrate that operational reforms, (e.g., body-worn cameras and community policing) preferred by police can produce constrained institutional change. Such reforms may improve performance, but by preserving bureaucratic autonomy, they increase the police’s structural power and ability to resist future structural reforms, complicating efforts to address police violence

Autonomy · Bureaucracy · Community policing · Democracy · Language change · Political science · Politics · Reform Act · Veto · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Policing Practices and Perceptions · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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