Designing Markets
Why Competitive Bidding and Auctions in Government Often Fail To Deliver
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6330620 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew B Whitford (0000-0002-6428-3471, University of Georgia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 61-85 |
| Publication date | 2007-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2007.00207.x |
| OpenAlex | W2121988066 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 67 |
Governments continue to embrace the market‐like mechanisms of auctions and bidding. This essay considers how governments (as bid‐takers) and firms and nonprofits (as bidders) strategically interact in the design and implementation of these systems. I assess with regard to the uniqueness of bidding in government four principles on the role of: credible commitments, rational collusion, the setting of reserve prices, and heterogeneity among bidders. I also address recent calls for expanding the use of dynamic pricing in government
Bidding · Business · Collusion · Common value auction · Economics · Government (linguistics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Public economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Public Procurement and Policy
Auctioning out education
Design, Performance and Interstate Collaboration
Collusion in auctions for emission permits
The role of communication on an experimental market for tradable development rights
The Role of Power and Competition in Contracting Out
Antecedents of Contracting-Back-In
The Effects of Competition‐Based Public Policy on Contractual Arrangements
Relational Contracting and Network Management
When new public management fails
Carbon Taxation and Policy Labeling
Red tape, its origins, uses, and abuses
Experimental Economics
Institutions and Social Conflict
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to Catv
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Why Regulate Utilities?
Optimal Auction Design
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Price-fixing Overcharges
Markets as Politics
Pricing and Firm Conduct in California's Deregulated Electricity Market
Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions
Markets as Politics
Incentives in Government Contracting
Buying in a Businesslike Fashion— And Paying More
Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare
Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions
A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions
Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics
Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality
Matching Responsibilities with Tactics
A Framework for Evaluating the Government Contracting-Out Decision with an Application to Information Technology
How Competitive Is Competitive Bidding? The Case of the Single Regeneration Budget Program
Transaction Costs and Institutional Explanations for Government Service Production Decisions
Privatization and Its Reverse
A Political Perspective on Contracting Out
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Selling Spectrum Rights
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,59 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2021 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |