The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection

Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China

Bibliographic Data

ID6342248
AuthorsHanzhang Liu (0000-0003-1003-1372, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume7
Issue04
Pages853-870
Publication date2019-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2018.24
OpenAlexW3124951333
LanguageEN
Citations received20
References cited33

Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites’ logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate’s chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time

Authoritarianism · Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Elite · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Preference · Selection (genetic algorithm · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies

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