Oil wealth dissatisfaction and political trust in Norway

A resource curse

Bibliographic Data

ID6406091
AuthorsOla Listhaug (Norwegian University of Science and Technology, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume28
Issue4
Pages834-851
Publication date2005-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueWest European Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01402380500216955
OpenAlexW2017638429
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited17

Recent scholarship has proposed a resource curse hypothesis arguing that an abundance of natural resources stimulates dysfunctional economic policy choices and rent-seeking, creates conflicts over the distribution of wealth, and, ultimately, can lead to civil war. Norway has attempted to avoid the resource curse by using state institutions to bring oil wealth under political control, including a strong government involvement in the production of oil, a tax regime that guarantees a large income to the state from oil production, and the more recent establishment of an oil fund invested abroad. The strong state involvement in the oil sector strengthens citizens' expectations of benefits they may receive. As much of the wealth is locked up in the oil fund – a fast growing cake that voters cannot eat – voters have become morenegative regarding the current policy, which they see as too tight on spending. We demonstrate that oil wealth dissatisfaction most likely contributes to the recent decline in political trust in Norway. Compared to other forms of resource curse effects, we consider the Norwegian variety a mild form

Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Resource (disambiguation · Resource curse · Global Energy Security and Policy · Law · Market Dynamics and Volatility · Natural Resources and Economic Development

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