Does politics crowd out professional competence? The organisation of ministerial advice in Denmark and Sweden
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6408023 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Peter Munk Christiansen (0000-0001-8808-500X, Aarhus University), Birgitta Niklasson (0000-0001-9035-8556, University of Gothenburg), Patrik Öhberg (0000-0002-7433-8552, University of Gothenburg) |
| Ano | 2016 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Fascículo | 6 |
| Páginas | 1230-1250 |
| Data de publicação | 2016-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | West European Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655 |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/01402382.2016.1176368 |
| OpenAlex | W2346910729 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 33 |
| Referências citadas | 55 |
The use of politically appointed ministerial advisors has increased noticeably in many Western countries, but we know little about how this development has affected the civil servants recruited on merit. The article asks whether political appointees accentuate or blur the line between politics and administration. Do political appointees take over political-tactical advice and leave policy advice to the permanent civil service, or do they cause permanent civil servants to be even more influenced by political considerations? And do political appointees make it easier or more difficult for the permanent civil service to be politically responsive? A Most Similar Systems Design comparison of Denmark and Sweden allows an assessment of the effects of political appointees. It is found that a large number of political appointees decreases functional politicisation of the permanent civil service; that functional politicisation tends to crowd out tasks related to more classic policy advice; and that functional politicisation increases political responsiveness
Advice (programming · Civil servants · Civil service · Competence (human resources · Economics · Management · Political culture · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public service · Sociology · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Policy and Reform Studies
The interactive effects of professionalism and politicization
Does politicization influence senior public officials’ work attitudes? Different forms and effects of politicization in the civil service
Politicization of the Bureaucracy across and within Administrative Traditions
Functional Politicization in Practice. From Responsive Competence to Reflexive Functional Politicization
Balancing Neutral and Responsive Competences in the Context of Functional Politicization
Stepping stones or party placements? Post-ministerial cabinet careers of Belgian ministerial advisers (1999–2020)
From ménage à trois back to pas de deux? Ministerial advisers, civil servants and the contest of policy ideas
Bridging the Archipelago
The Invisible Architects of Public Engagement
Technocracy in Planning Policymaking
More delegation, more political control? Politicization of senior-level appointments in 18 European countries
Maintaining neutrality in the Minister's office
Ministerial advisers in executive government
The partisan–professional dichotomy revisited
Bubbling up or cascading down? Public servants, political advisers and politicization
Political control of coordination? The roles of ministerial advisers in government coordination in Denmark and Sweden
Still friends? Revisiting New Zealand public servants’ perceptions of ministerial advisers
Public service bargains and non-partisan ministerial advisors
A comparative analysis of senior civil servants’ involvement in media management
Speaking truth to power
Political change and administrative turnover in meritocratic systems
Agency independence and credibility in primary bond markets
Politics, Competence, and Performance
Who Does What Work in a Ministerial Office
Inclusive meritocracy
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The Determinants of Promotion to High Public Office in Germany
Bureaucratic dilemmas
Comparing ministerial advisers across politicization settings
Politicisation of the Czech Republic’s ministries
The Minister Wants it
Leadership At The Apex
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics
From Max Weber
The Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective
Politicization of the Civil Service
Multilevel Analysis
The Value of The Dichotomy
How Much Responsiveness is Too Much or Too Little
Early Swedish representation
Cages of reason
Complementarity of Politics and Administration as a Legitimate Alternative to the Dichotomy Model
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies
Truth in Government and the Politicization of Public Service Advice
Ministerial Advisers, Politicization and the Retreat From Westminster
Ministers and Top Officials in the Dutch Core Executive
Ensuring political responsiveness
Linking administrative career patterns and politicization
Explaining differences in ministerial ménages à trois
Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies
Testing Pendleton's Premise
Responsiveness and Neutral Competence in American Bureaucracy
The Merit of Meritocratization
The Consequences of Presidential Patronage for Federal Agency Performance
Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970–1987 ‐ Toward Hybridization
Mandarins or Managers? The Bureaucratic Elite in Bonn, 1970 to 1987 and Beyond
Politicization and the Replacement of Top Civil Servants inDenmark
Revisiting Politicization
Advising Howard
Conceptualising Advisers' Policy Work
Cages of Reason
The Sage Handbook of Public Administration
The Study of Administration
From Max Weber
| Obras citantes distintas | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 3,67 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 33 |