Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good

The Strategic Role of States and Refugees

Datos Bibliográficos

ID7877486
AutoresPhilipp Lutz (0000-0003-2373-0180, University of Geneva Geneva, autor de correspondencia), Dorothy Kaufmann (0000-0002-4185-4550, ETH Zurich Zürich), Anna Stünzi (0000-0002-5854-3126, ETH Zurich Zürich)
Año2020
Volumen58
Número3
Páginas757-775
Fecha de publicación2020-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/jcms.12974
OpenAlexW2979633073
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas14
Referencias citadas62

The surge of refugees arriving in Europe has accentuated the malfunctioning of the common European asylum system: the lack of coordination between nation states and failure in the common protection of refugees were the main outcomes of the so‐called refugee crisis. This article builds on the literature on public goods and policy compliance in order to explain the failure of European countries to provide humanitarian protection to refugees. A sequential game‐theoretical model serves to demonstrate the strategic interaction between states and refugees in European asylum policy. The analysis demonstrates that although both groups of actors benefit from a functioning European asylum system, they also have few incentives to contribute to the public good. States aim to reduce their individual refugee burden and refugees seek protection in their preferred destination country. The findings suggest that an effective provision of refugee protection requires both member states and refugees to contribute mutually to the public good

Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Incentive · Political science · Refugee · Law · Migration and Labor Dynamics · Migration, Health and Trauma · Migration, Refugees, and Integration