The No Alternatives Argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8396273 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Dawid (0000-0002-1472-2958, University of Vienna), Stephan Hartmann (0000-0001-8676-2177, Munich School of Philosophy), Jan Sprenger (0000-0003-0083-9685, Tilburg University) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 213-234 |
| Publication date | 2015-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axt045 |
| OpenAlex | W2023468058 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 36 |
| References cited | 11 |
Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the ‘no alternatives argument’) is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis. 1 Introduction2 The Conceptual Framework3 The No Alternatives Argument4 Discussion I: A Quantitative Analysis of the No Alternatives Argument5 Discussion II: The Number of Alternatives and the Problem of Underdetermination6 ConclusionsAppendix A Appendix B
Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Scientific theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies
The argument from the good lot
Theoretical Stability and Scientific Realism
Higgs Discovery and the Look Elsewhere Effect
Philosophy of Astrophysics
Delimiting the Unconceived
The Critique Machine
The Formal Structure(s) of Analogical Inference
The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment
Conjectures and Disconfirmations
Reasonable Doubt from Unconceived Alternatives
Confirmation, or pursuit-worthiness? Lessons from J. J. Sakurai's 1960 theory of the strong force for the debate on non-empirical physics
Complex linkages between forced labor slavery and environmental decline in marine fisheries
Alternative explanations of the cosmic microwave background
Doubts for Dawid's non-empirical theory assessment
Explanatory Consolidation
String theory, non-empirical theory assessment, and the context of pursuit
Rethinking holism and underdetermination
Bayesian perspectives on the discovery of the Higgs particle
Scientific realism
The reasonable doubt standard as inference to the best explanation
The life cycle of scientific principles—a template for characterizing physical principles
Should scientific realists embrace theoretical conservatism
String theory, Einstein, and the identity of physics
Meta-empirical confirmation
Cosmological inflation and meta-empirical theory assessment
The role of meta-empirical theory assessment in the acceptance of atomism
Meta-empirical support for eliminative reasoning
Scientific realism and empirical confirmation
Book Forum
On the very idea of pursuitworthiness
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence
Justifying Scientific Progress
Does the No Alternatives Argument Need Gerrymandering to Be Significant
Infinite Scale Skepticism
Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference
A Verisimilitude Framework for Inductive Inference, with an Application to Phylogenetics
Exceeding Our Grasp
Inference to the Best Explanation
The rationality of informal argumentation
Underdetermination and Theory Succession from the Perspective of String Theory
On the Conflicting Assessments of the Current Status of String Theory
Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting
How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions
On Novel Confirmation
The scientific image
| Unique citing works | 36 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,27 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 33 |