Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8397479
AutoresUwe Peters (0000-0002-7103-3921, University College London, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume72
Fascículo4
Páginas1061-1081
Data de publicação2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditoraOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axy079
OpenAlexW2906010609
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas17
Referências citadas38

The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level, even when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that this proposal assumes a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine the project of ensuring reliable belief-formation in science.

Affect (linguistics) · Cognition · Cognitive bias · Confirmation bias · Epistemology · Individualism · Philosophy of science · Political science · Reliability (semiconductor) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology