The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference

Datos Bibliográficos

ID8398763
AutoresJames Hawthorne (University of Kent, autor de correspondencia), J Landes (0000-0003-3105-6624, University of Oklahoma), Christian Wallmann (0009-0006-0612-5877, University of Kent), Jon Williamson (0000-0003-0514-4209, University of Oklahoma)
Año2017
Volumen68
Número1
Páginas123-131
Fecha de publicación2017-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/bjps/axv030
OpenAlexW2216306377
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas3

We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument 2 Some Objections Met

Appeal · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Principal (computer security) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy