What Accuracy Could Not Be
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8399160 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Graham Oddie (0000-0002-9934-246X, University of Colorado Denver, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 551-580 |
| Publication date | 2019-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axx032 |
| OpenAlex | W2620827000 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 21 |
Two different programmes are in the business of explicating accuracy—the truthlikeness programme and the epistemic utility programme. Both assume that truth is the goal of inquiry, and that among inquiries that fall short of realizing the goal some get closer to it than others. Truthlikeness theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of propositions. Epistemic utility theorists have been searching for an account of the accuracy of credal states. Both assume we can make cognitive progress in an inquiry even while falling short of the target. I show that the prospects for combining these two programmes are bleak. A core accuracy principle, proximity, that is universally embraced within the truthlikeness programme turns out to be incompatible with a central principle within the epistemic utility programme, namely propriety. 1. Truthlikeness and Epistemic Utility2. Inquiries3. Accuracy for Propositions4. Proximity5. Accuracy for Credal States6. Propriety7. Proximity for Credal States8. Extensionality9. Admissible Weightings10. Propriety Violates Proximity11. Possible Responses 11.1. Retreat to convexity11.2. Reject boundedness11.3. Reject additivity12. The Upshot
Core (optical fiber) · Epistemology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
What’s Wrong with Stereotypes
Truthlikeness and the inclusion fallacy
Is A Little Learning Dangerous
Headaches for epistemologists
Good Guesses
Veritism refuted? Understanding, idealization, and the facts
Propositional and credal accuracy in an indeterministic world
Truthlikeness for probabilistic laws
Approaching probabilistic truths
Approaching deterministic and probabilistic truth
Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism
Approaching probabilistic laws
Scoring, truthlikeness, and value
New Semantics for Bayesian Inference
A Note on Verisimilitude and Accuracy
Accuracy and Verisimilitude
Bayesians Too Should Follow Wason
Probability and Evidence
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Conjectures and Refutations
Truthlikeness
Justifying Conditionalization
Twilight Of The Perfect Model Model
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
Knowledge in a Social World
Naive and refined truth approximation
Inductive inconsistencies
The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I
Joyce's Argument for Probabilism
Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism
Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value
On Popper's Definitions of Verisimilitude 1
Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude
Probability and evidence
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences
| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,43 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |