What Makes a Good Decision? Robust Satisficing as a Normative Standard of Rational Decision Making

Bibliographic Data

ID8975689
AuthorsBarry Schwartz (0000-0001-6947-9871, Swarthmore College, corresponding author), Yakov Ben‐Haim (0000-0001-7229-8449, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology), Clifford C Dacso (0000-0002-0710-1678, Institute for the Future), CLIFF DACSO
Year2010
Volume41
Issue2
Pages209-227
Publication date2010-11-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-5914.2010.00450.x
OpenAlexW1950241088
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited40

Most decisions in life involve ambiguity, where probabilities can not be meaningfully specified, as much as they involve probabilistic uncertainty. In such conditions, the aspiration to utility maximization may be self‐deceptive. We propose “robust satisficing” as an alternative to utility maximizing as the normative standard for rational decision making in such circumstances. Instead of seeking to maximize the expected value, or utility, of a decision outcome, robust satisficing aims to maximize the robustness to uncertainty of a satisfactory outcome. That is, robust satisficing asks, “what is a ‘good enough’ outcome,” and then seeks the option that will produce such an outcome under the widest set of circumstances. We explore the conditions under which robust satisficing is a more appropriate norm for decision making than utility maximizing

Ambiguity · Decision theory · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Normative · Outcome (game theory · Probabilistic logic · Rationality · Robustness (evolution · Satisficing · Subjective expected utility · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life · Risk Perception and Management

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