Cyber Warfare & Inadvertent Escalation

Bibliographic Data

ID9685451
AuthorsJames M Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume149
Issue2
Pages133-149
Publication date2020-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueDaedalus (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0011-5266 • E-ISSN: 1548-6192
PublisherMIT Press - Journals (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1162/daed_a_01794
OpenAlexW3013576374
LanguageEN
Citations received4

The advent of cyber warfare exacerbates the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict. In theory, cyber espionage and cyberattacks could enhance one state's ability to undermine another's nuclear deterrent. Regardless of how effective such operations might prove in practice, fear of them could generate escalatory “use-‘em-before-you-lose-‘em” pressures. Additionally, cyber threats could create three qualitatively new mechanisms by which a nuclear-armed state might incorrectly conclude that its nuclear deterrent was under attack. First, cyber espionage could be mistaken for a cyberattack. Second, malware could accidentally spread from systems that supported non-nuclear operations to nuclear-related systems. Third, an operation carried out by a third party could be misattributed by one state in a bilateral confrontation to its opponent. Two approaches to risk reduction are potentially viable in the short term: unilateral restraint in conducting potentially escalatory cyber operations, and bilateral or multilateral behavioral norms

Adversary · Business · Computer security · Cyberwarfare · Espionage · Malware · Nuclear weapon · Political science · State (computer science · Computer Science · Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies · Information and Cyber Security · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense

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