Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract
Treating, Cheating and Case Finding
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9707779 |
|---|---|
| Autores | H Gravelle (0000-0002-7753-4233, University of York), Madeline Sutton (0000-0002-6635-2127, University of Manchester), Matt Sutton (University of Manchester), Ada Ma (0000-0002-2117-2616, University of Aberdeen) |
| Ano | 2010 |
| Volume | 120 |
| Fascículo | 542 |
| Páginas | F129-F156 |
| Data de publicação | 2010-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02340.x |
| OpenAlex | W2056230710 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 18 |
| Referências citadas | 23 |
The UK National Health Service introduced a pay for performance scheme for primary care providers in 2004/5. The scheme rewarded providers for the proportion of eligible patients who received appropriate treatment. Eligible patients were those who had been reported by the provider as having the relevant disease minus those they exception reported as not suitable for treatment. Using rich provider level data, we find that differences in reported disease rates between providers, and differences in exception rates both between and within providers, suggest gaming. Faced with ratio performance indicators, providers acted on denominators as well as numerators. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2010
Cheating · Economics · Management · Sociology · Healthcare cost, quality, practices · Healthcare Policy and Management · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Individual performance-based incentives for health care workers in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries
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Can economic incentives enhance adoption and use of a household energy technology? Evidence from a pilot study in Cambodia
Is the distribution of care quality provided under pay-for-performance equitable? Evidence from the Advancing Quality programme in England
The influence of welfare systems on pay-for-performance programs for general practitioners
Introduction
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How do clinical quality and patient satisfaction vary with provider size in primary care? Evidence from English general practice panel data
Paying for primary care
How do individuals' health behaviours respond to an increase in the supply of health care? Evidence from a natural experiment
Competing and coexisting logics in the changing field of English general medical practice
Regression Analysis of Count Data
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses
Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Alternative Approaches to Evaluation in Empirical Microeconomics
Deprivation and quality of primary care services
| Obras citantes distintas | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,38 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2013 - 2023 (11) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 18 |