The German 4G Spectrum Auction
Design and Behaviour
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9715858 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Cramton (0000-0001-8621-1092, University of Maryland), Axel Ockenfels (0000-0003-1456-0191, University of Cologne) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 127 |
| Issue | 605 |
| Pages | F305-F324 |
| Publication date | 2017-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12406 |
| OpenAlex | W2765806658 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 48 |
The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi‐band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was efficient. However, our analysis suggests that independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to coordinate implicitly on a low‐revenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One important focal point involved post‐auction negotiations, posing risks to bidders and the auctioneer. We analyse different bidding scenarios and how post‐auction negotiations can affect values, bidding and efficiency. We also discuss how the simultaneous ascending auction format can be augmented to mitigate the risks
Auction theory · Bidding · Economics · Generalized second-price auction · German · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Revenue · Revenue equivalence · Reverse auction · Spectrum auction · Vickrey auction · Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Finance
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2023 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |