Asymmetry in Procurement Auctions
Evidence from Snow Removal Contracts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9717946 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Véronique Flambard (0000-0003-2620-6552, MacEwan University), Isabelle Perrigne (Pennsylvania State University) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 116 |
| Issue | 514 |
| Pages | 1014-1036 |
| Publication date | 2006-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01121.x |
| OpenAlex | W2018483371 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 26 |
Differences in cost efficiency and productivity across firms may introduce asymmetries in procurement auctions. Relying on a structural approach, this article investigates potential asymmetry among firms bidding for snow removal contracts in Montréal. The empirical results show that firms located in close proximity have a cost advantage relative to other firms in the most urbanised part of Montréal because of prohibitive equipment storage costs. The extent of inefficiency due to asymmetry is empirically assessed. Various policy experiments are performed. A bidding preference policy shows that the city could expect to reduce its costs for allocating snow removal contracts. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006
Business · Common value auction · Economics · Geography · Library science · Management · Microeconomics · Procurement · Snow · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Public Procurement and Policy
| Citations per year | 0.4 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2022 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |