Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance
A Framed Field Experiment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718882 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Stüber (0000-0002-2101-4271, New York University Abu Dhabi , United Arab Emirates, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 662 |
| Pages | 2580-2620 |
| Publication date | 2024-08-22 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueae018 |
| OpenAlex | W4392630685 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 49 |
Why are high monetary payments prohibited for certain goods, thereby causing shortages in their supply? I conduct (i) a framed field experiment with a general population sample and (ii) a survey experiment with this sample and with ethics committees. In the experiment, participants can prohibit others from being offered money to register as stem-cell donors. I document that, whereas the majority of participants do not respond to changes in the incentives (63%) or become more in favour of the offer with higher incentives (20%), a minority of 17% prohibit high incentives. I show that this minority wants to protect individuals who are persuaded by high incentives. I also show that a lottery scheme reduces their objections to high incentives. Finally, I document that the public is much more supportive of high incentives than are ethics committees
Economics · Field (mathematics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Mathematics
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |