Evaluating Vacancy Referrals and the Roles of Sanctions and Sickness Absence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9950007 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerard J Van Den Berg (0000-0001-7354-7486, CREST, CNRS, IAB Nuremberg, DIW Berlin, IZA), Barbara Hofmann (0000-0003-1151-793X, CREST, CNRS, IAB Nuremberg, DIW Berlin, IZA), Arne Uhlendorff (0000-0002-2823-4445, CREST, CNRS, IAB Nuremberg, DIW Berlin, IZA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/uez032 |
| OpenAlex | W2937663755 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 1 |
Job vacancy referrals are a common active labor market policy measure. Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. During sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behaviour do not apply. This may reduce the threat effect of sanctions. We study effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on unemployment durations and job match quality. We find that a vacancy referral increases the transition rate into work. We also find a positive effect of a vacancy referral on the probability of reporting sick
Actuarial science · Business · Demographic economics · Economic growth · Economics · Family medicine · Hazard · Incentive · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political science · Referral · Sanctions · Unemployment · Vacancy defect · Work (physics · Employment and Welfare Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Law · Medicine · Taxation and Compliance Studies
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |