The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9950106 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philippos Louis (0000-0003-1316-4701, University of Cyprus, Cyprus), Matías Núñez (0009-0005-0790-5405, CREST & Ecole Polytechnique, France), Dimitrios Xefteris (0000-0001-7397-5288, University of Cyprus, Cyprus) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 132 |
| Issue | 641 |
| Pages | 326-360 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueab057 |
| OpenAlex | W2944764089 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 55 |
Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e., preference homogeneity) within a group? And if so, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that decision mechanisms that promote consensual behaviour generate substantially higher levels of post-decision actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical procedures that incentivise subjects to exaggerate their differences
Agreement · Economics · Epistemology · Homogeneity (statistics · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Positive economics · Preference · Statistics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |