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Management of the new pay systems in the public sector — some implications of insights gained from experiments

Bibliographic Data

ID9961356
AuthorsKirsten Bregn (Roskilde University, corresponding author)
Year2008
Volume74
Issue1
Pages79-93
Publication date2008-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Review of Administrative Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-8523 • E-ISSN: 1461-7226
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0020852307085735
OpenAlexW2079431743
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited58

During recent decades, new pay systems have been widely introduced in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Experiments draw attention to some aspects which are normally not included in analyses of pay systems, namely fairness and reciprocity. Furthermore, the experiments indicate a different understanding of what are perceived as gains and losses than what is assumed in conventional economic theory, and they also indicate an asymmetric evaluation of gains and losses. The aim of the article is to present some results from these experiments and to investigate their implications for pay systems in the public sector. The conclusion is that the results have important implications for the management of pay systems, and due to some specific characteristics of the public sector, for management of pay systems in the public sector in particular. Points for practitioners Insights gained from experiments concerning fairness, reciprocity and perceived gains and losses shed a new light on management of pay. They stress the importance of managers taking responsibility for ensuring acceptance of criteria for pay supplements and bonuses, and for a realistic formation of expectations about pay supplements and bonuses. Moreover, the managers need to ensure that supplements and bonuses are provided in accordance with the criteria in such a way that the allocation of supplements and bonuses is considered to be fair, and justified expectations are met. This can be particularly difficult in the public sector. Thus, considerable caution in relation to using the individualization of pay to motivate employees in the public sector is recommended

Business · Economics · Public economics · Public sector · Reciprocity (cultural anthropology · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Marketing · Psychology

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Citations per year0.17
Citation span2014 - 2018 (5)
Highly citedNo

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