Marc-Kevin Daoust
Biographic Data
| ID | 1305404 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marc-Kevin Daoust |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marc-Kevin |
| FAMILY NAME | Daoust |
| SIGNATURE | DAOUST M |
| AFFILIATIONS | École de Technologie Supérieure |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6710-1944 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Robustness and the Distinctive Properties of Epistemic Ideals
Why care about ideal epistemic norms? Why not merely care about norms that agents like us can actually meet? In this paper, I make two claims. First, I argue that, if we want robust epistemic norms, we can’t just do idealised epistemology. We need to confirm that the results and observations that are central in idealised epistemology also obtain in other contexts. Second, I argue that, if we really want to capture the fundamental nature of episte…
Le développement d’une IA explicable: Entre principes éthiques généraux et mesures concrètes
Les ingénieurs en IA ont besoin de directives applicables pour l’implémentation de principes éthiques dans leurs solutions technologiques. Mais comment y arriver ? Dans cet article, nous prenons le cas du développement de l’intelligence artificielle explicable (XIA) comme point de départ. Sur le plan des mesures concrètes devant être intégrées à l’IA pour la rendre explicable, nous remettons en question l’approche universaliste. Nous proposons un…
Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality
Transformative experiences, rational decisions and shark attacks
How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul ([2014]. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rationa…
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence
What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various acti…
Coherence, First-Personal Deliberation, and Crossword Puzzles
What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation? According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first-personal deliberation. When we deliberate, we should merely care about the reasons or evidence we have for our attitudes. So, considerations of coherence should not show up in deliberation. In response to this argument, Worsnip (2021) argues that considerations of coh…
Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules
The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals
Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. Ho…
Deux enjeux philosophiques entourant la structure des recommandations issues du secteur public
L'une des fonctions des institutions publiques des démocraties libérales est de formuler des recommandations à l'attention des décideurs. Or, les institutions publiques savent que leurs recommandations seront souvent ignorées en partie par le décideur. Cette situation de « conformité partielle » aux recommandations soulève plusieurs problèmes de nature philosophique pour les institutions. En nous appuyant sur une analyse de 570 recommandations ti…
Two Philosophical Issues Surrounding the Structure of Public-Policy Recommendations
One of the key responsibilities of public institutions in liberal democracies is to formulate recommendations for decision makers. However, public institutions realize that decision makers will often partly ignore their recommendations. This situation of “partial compliance” with recommendations raises a number of philosophical issues for institutions. Based on an analysis of 570 recommendations drawn from 40 Quebec public-sector documents and re…
Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle
Many epistemologists have argued that there is some degree of independence between individual and collective reliability. The question, then, is: To what extent are the two independent of each other? And in which contexts do they come apart? In this paper, I present a new case confirming the independence between individual and collective reliability optimization. I argue that, in voting groups, optimizing individual reliability can conflict with …
Immodesty and permissivism
False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence
False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards, they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet some epistemologists think that, while one's evidence is normative (i.e., one's available evidence affects the doxastic states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one's false beliefs cannot be evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating false beliefs differ…
Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications
Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being…
The explanatory role of consistency requirements
Repenser la neutralité axiologique: Objectivité, autonomie et délibération publique
L'objectif de cet article est double. D'une part, il vise à identifier une interprétation éthique de la neutralité axiologique, et non de réduire ce critère à des considérations épistémologiques comme la distinction entre faits et valeurs. On peut, en effet, interpréter le critère de neutralité axiologique comme un mécanisme visant à défendre l'autonomie des différents membres de la communauté universitaire. D'autre part, cet article entend utili…
Repenser la neutralité axiologique: Objectivité, autonomie et délibération publique
L'objectif de cet article est double. D'une part, il vise à identifier une interprétation éthique de la neutralité axiologique, et non de réduire ce critère à des considérations épistémologiques comme la distinction entre faits et valeurs. On peut, en effet, interpréter le critère de neutralité axiologique comme un mécanisme visant à défendre l'autonomie des différents membres de la communauté universitaire. D'autre part, cet article entend utili…
Repenser la neutralité axiologique: Objectivité, autonomie et délibération publique
L'objectif de cet article est double. D'une part, il vise à identifier une interprétation éthique de la neutralité axiologique, et non de réduire ce critère à des considérations épistémologiques comme la distinction entre faits et valeurs. On peut, en effet, interpréter le critère de neutralité axiologique comme un mécanisme visant à défendre l'autonomie des différents membres de la communauté universitaire. D'autre part, cet article entend utili…
Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications
Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being…
The explanatory role of consistency requirements
False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence
False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards, they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet some epistemologists think that, while one's evidence is normative (i.e., one's available evidence affects the doxastic states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one's false beliefs cannot be evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating false beliefs differ…
Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle
Many epistemologists have argued that there is some degree of independence between individual and collective reliability. The question, then, is: To what extent are the two independent of each other? And in which contexts do they come apart? In this paper, I present a new case confirming the independence between individual and collective reliability optimization. I argue that, in voting groups, optimizing individual reliability can conflict with …
Immodesty and permissivism
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence
What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various acti…
Coherence, First-Personal Deliberation, and Crossword Puzzles
What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation? According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first-personal deliberation. When we deliberate, we should merely care about the reasons or evidence we have for our attitudes. So, considerations of coherence should not show up in deliberation. In response to this argument, Worsnip (2021) argues that considerations of coh…
Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules
The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals
Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. Ho…
Deux enjeux philosophiques entourant la structure des recommandations issues du secteur public
L'une des fonctions des institutions publiques des démocraties libérales est de formuler des recommandations à l'attention des décideurs. Or, les institutions publiques savent que leurs recommandations seront souvent ignorées en partie par le décideur. Cette situation de « conformité partielle » aux recommandations soulève plusieurs problèmes de nature philosophique pour les institutions. En nous appuyant sur une analyse de 570 recommandations ti…
Two Philosophical Issues Surrounding the Structure of Public-Policy Recommendations
One of the key responsibilities of public institutions in liberal democracies is to formulate recommendations for decision makers. However, public institutions realize that decision makers will often partly ignore their recommendations. This situation of “partial compliance” with recommendations raises a number of philosophical issues for institutions. Based on an analysis of 570 recommendations drawn from 40 Quebec public-sector documents and re…
Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality
Transformative experiences, rational decisions and shark attacks
How can we make rational decisions that involve transformative experiences, that is, experiences that can radically change our core preferences? L. A. Paul ([2014]. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) has argued that many decisions involving transformative experiences cannot be rational. However, Paul acknowledges that some traumatic events can be transformative experiences, but are nevertheless not an obstacle to rationa…
Le développement d’une IA explicable: Entre principes éthiques généraux et mesures concrètes
Les ingénieurs en IA ont besoin de directives applicables pour l’implémentation de principes éthiques dans leurs solutions technologiques. Mais comment y arriver ? Dans cet article, nous prenons le cas du développement de l’intelligence artificielle explicable (XIA) comme point de départ. Sur le plan des mesures concrètes devant être intégrées à l’IA pour la rendre explicable, nous remettons en question l’approche universaliste. Nous proposons un…
Robustness and the Distinctive Properties of Epistemic Ideals
Why care about ideal epistemic norms? Why not merely care about norms that agents like us can actually meet? In this paper, I make two claims. First, I argue that, if we want robust epistemic norms, we can’t just do idealised epistemology. We need to confirm that the results and observations that are central in idealised epistemology also obtain in other contexts. Second, I argue that, if we really want to capture the fundamental nature of episte…
Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works)