Michael J Watkins
Biographic Data
| ID | 1659732 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael J Watkins |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael J |
| FAMILY NAME | Watkins |
| SIGNATURE | WATKINS M J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Auburn University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1974 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Colors, Perceptual Variation, and Science
Supervenience and Realization
Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians…
What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist
In a recent paper, ‘On the Persistence of Phenomenology’ (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the …
Colours and Causes
Frank Jackson et Robert Pargetter défendent l'idée que la couleur rouge est lapropriété, quelle qu'elle soit, qui cause ou causerait l'apparition de rouge dans notre expérience visuelle. Ceci empêche la couleur rouge d'être une propriété dispositionnelle, soutiennent-ils, puisque les propriétés dispositionnelles sont causalement inertes. Pour des raisons similaires, Us concluent aussi que la couleur rouge ne peut pas être une propriété disjonctiv…
What Our Colour Experiences Don't Teach Us
Paul Boghossian et David Velleman ont soutenu que les théories physicalistes des couleurs — celles qui identifient les propriétés de couleur avec certaines propriétés physiques des objets ou de la lumière—ne peuvent accommoder l'intuition profonde selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas être dans l'erreur au sujet des contenus représentationnels de nos expériences de couleur. Contre Boghossian et Velleman, je soutiens que cette intuition prétendue que…
Mediationism and the obfuscation of memory
Memory theorizing is going nowhere. The reason is that it is rooted in mediationism, the doctrine that memory is mediated by some sort of memory trace. Mediationism is the basic tenet of those who seek the substrate of memory; for students of memory per se it is merely a metaphor, and moreover an unfruitful one, for it cannot be penetrated by the methods of psychology. The rejection of mediationism would serve both to replace mechanistic theories…
Determining perceived meaning during impression formation
The meaning change hypothesis says that the individual items of information from which an impression of someone is formed tend to be perceived in a way consistent with the overall impression. It is argued here that the evidence usually considered as the principal experimental support for this hypothesis is artifactual, the product of a spurious method of determining perceived meaning. We describe a new method in which, following a series of perso…
Modifying Waugh & Norman's primary memory measurement procedure
Martin & Jones (1979) suggested a modification of Waugh & Norman's (1965) procedure for measuring primary memory, one that would take into account negative recency in secondary memory. Specifically, they proposed that secondary memory representation could be estimated from a function selected as approximating negative recency effects observed with delayed recall procedures. It is argued here that there are problems with this particular approach, …
When retrieval cueing fails
Does presenting a hint, or retrieval cue, for recall of an event change the memory trace for the event even when the cue does not in fact produce recall? An experiment by McLeod, Williams & Broadbent (1971) suggests that it may. A conclusion to this effect would have important theoretical implications. In particular, it would pose difficulties for specifying trace structure. McLeod et al. observed that a retrieval cue was more effective if its ta…
Concept and measurement of primary memory
Determining perceived meaning during impression formation
The meaning change hypothesis says that the individual items of information from which an impression of someone is formed tend to be perceived in a way consistent with the overall impression. It is argued here that the evidence usually considered as the principal experimental support for this hypothesis is artifactual, the product of a spurious method of determining perceived meaning. We describe a new method in which, following a series of perso…
Supervenience and Realization
Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians…
What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist
In a recent paper, ‘On the Persistence of Phenomenology’ (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the …
Concept and measurement of primary memory
When retrieval cueing fails
Does presenting a hint, or retrieval cue, for recall of an event change the memory trace for the event even when the cue does not in fact produce recall? An experiment by McLeod, Williams & Broadbent (1971) suggests that it may. A conclusion to this effect would have important theoretical implications. In particular, it would pose difficulties for specifying trace structure. McLeod et al. observed that a retrieval cue was more effective if its ta…
Modifying Waugh & Norman's primary memory measurement procedure
Martin & Jones (1979) suggested a modification of Waugh & Norman's (1965) procedure for measuring primary memory, one that would take into account negative recency in secondary memory. Specifically, they proposed that secondary memory representation could be estimated from a function selected as approximating negative recency effects observed with delayed recall procedures. It is argued here that there are problems with this particular approach, …
Determining perceived meaning during impression formation
The meaning change hypothesis says that the individual items of information from which an impression of someone is formed tend to be perceived in a way consistent with the overall impression. It is argued here that the evidence usually considered as the principal experimental support for this hypothesis is artifactual, the product of a spurious method of determining perceived meaning. We describe a new method in which, following a series of perso…
Mediationism and the obfuscation of memory
Memory theorizing is going nowhere. The reason is that it is rooted in mediationism, the doctrine that memory is mediated by some sort of memory trace. Mediationism is the basic tenet of those who seek the substrate of memory; for students of memory per se it is merely a metaphor, and moreover an unfruitful one, for it cannot be penetrated by the methods of psychology. The rejection of mediationism would serve both to replace mechanistic theories…
Colours and Causes
Frank Jackson et Robert Pargetter défendent l'idée que la couleur rouge est lapropriété, quelle qu'elle soit, qui cause ou causerait l'apparition de rouge dans notre expérience visuelle. Ceci empêche la couleur rouge d'être une propriété dispositionnelle, soutiennent-ils, puisque les propriétés dispositionnelles sont causalement inertes. Pour des raisons similaires, Us concluent aussi que la couleur rouge ne peut pas être une propriété disjonctiv…
What Our Colour Experiences Don't Teach Us
Paul Boghossian et David Velleman ont soutenu que les théories physicalistes des couleurs — celles qui identifient les propriétés de couleur avec certaines propriétés physiques des objets ou de la lumière—ne peuvent accommoder l'intuition profonde selon laquelle nous ne pouvons pas être dans l'erreur au sujet des contenus représentationnels de nos expériences de couleur. Contre Boghossian et Velleman, je soutiens que cette intuition prétendue que…
What is it Like to be a Phenomenologist
In a recent paper, ‘On the Persistence of Phenomenology’ (in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn, 1995), Diana Raffman presents a new argument for qualia, an argument that provides new focus for the qualia debate. We think Raffman's work relocates the debate to a better neighbourhood, a neighbourhood in which what tempts us to think that there must be qualia or phenomenal information is highlighted. Raffman, we argue, locates the …
Supervenience and Realization
Aestheticians generally agree that the aesthetic features of an object depend upon the non-aesthetic features of an object, and that this dependence can be captured by some formulation of the supervenience relation. I argue that the aesthetic depends upon the non-aesthetic in various and importantly different ways; that these dependence relations cannot be explained by supervenience; that appeals to supervenience create puzzles that aestheticians…
Colors, Perceptual Variation, and Science
Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Cognitive psychology (5 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Memory Processes and Influences (4 works) · Art (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Recall (3 works)