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Aaron Smuts

Biographic Data

ID996824
NAMEAaron Smuts
GIVEN NAMESAaron
FAMILY NAMESmuts
SIGNATURESMUTS A
AFFILIATIONSRhode Island College
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS19
TOTAL CITATIONS28
WORKS AS AUTHOR16
WORKS AS EDITOR3
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1980
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX3
  • Dedication

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•CHAPTER•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2024

  • Copyright Page

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•OTHER•The Oxford Handbook of the…•2024

  • The “No Reasons” View

    Aaron Smuts•CHAPTER•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2023

    Although we can try to explain why we love, we can never justify our love. Love is neither based on reasons, nor is it responsive to reasons, nor can it be assessed for normative reasons. Love can be odd, unfortunate, fortuitous, or even sadly lacking, but it can never be appropriate or inappropriate. We may have a variety of reasons to act on our love, but we cannot justify our loving feelings. Shakespeare’s Bottom was right: “Reason and love ke…

  • Welfare, Meaning, and Worth

    Aaron Smuts•BOOK•Welfare, Meaning, and Worth•2017

    Welfare, Meaning, and Worth argues that there is more to what makes a life worth living than welfare, and that a good life does not consist of what is merely good for the one who lives it. Smuts defends an objective list theory that states that the notion of worth captures matters of importance for which no plausible theory of welfare can account. He puts forth that lives worth living are net high in various objective goods, including pleasure, m…

  • The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•BOOK•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2017•Cited by: 5

    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love offers a wide array of original essays on the nature and value of love. The editors, Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts, have assembled an esteemed group of thinkers, including both established scholars and younger voices. The volume contains thirty-three essays addressing both issues about love as well as key philosophers who have contributed to the philosophy of love, such as Plato, Kierkegaard, Schopenha…

  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part I

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 34

    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view …

  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part II

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 2•References: 22

    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view …

  • Five Tests for What Makes a Life Worth Living

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•2013

  • The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2013•Cited by: 11•References: 13

    I defend the theory that one's life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good. Call this the good cause account ( GCA ) of the meaning of life. It holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one's life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good. I argu…

  • The power to make others worship

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Religious Studies•2012

    Can any being worthy of worship make others worship it? I think not. By way of an analogy to love, I argue that it is perfectly coherent to think that one could be made to worship. However, forcing someone to worship violates their autonomy, not because worship must be freely given, but because forced worship would be inauthentic – much like love earned through potions. For this reason, I argue that one cannot be made to worship a fitting object;…

  • Less Good but Not Bad

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2012•Cited by: 4

    In this article I defend innocuousism – a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On…

  • Immortality and Significance

    Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy and literature•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Although I reject his argument, I defend Bernard Williams's claim that we would lose reason to go on if we were to live forever. Through a consideration of Borges's story "The Immortal," I argue that immortality would be motivationally devastating, since our decisions would carry little weight, our achievements would be hollow victories of mere diligence, and the prospect of eternal frustration would haunt our every effort. An immortal life for t…

  • Art and Negative Affect

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 12

    Why do people seemingly want to be scared by movies and feel pity for fictional characters when they avoid situations in real life that arouse these same negative emotions? Although the domain of relevant artworks encompasses far more than just tragedy, the general problem is typically called the paradox of tragedy. The paradox boils down to a simple question: If people avoid pain then why do people want to experience art that is painful? I discu…

  • Uitbranding in die bediening

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1988•References: 1

    Ministry burnout Burnout is a hazard to which professional care-givers in the various helping professions are exposed. In this article burnout is described as a multidimensional construct, characterised by a state of emotional overload and subsequent exhaustion, resulting in a state of emotional detachment and depersonalisation. This must be differentiated from related conditions, such as tedium, stress and depression. Burnout as an occupational …

  • G.M. Pellissier oor die prediking

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1986

    In 'n sekere sin kan professor Pellissier die vader van die teologiese fakulteit van die Ned. Geref. Kerk aan die Universiteit van Pretoria genoem word. George Murray Pellissier was naamlik die eerste en vir vier jaar lank die enigste professor van die Ned. Geref. Kerk in die teologiese fakulteit aan die Universiteit van Pretoria. In 1934 — tans al meer as 'n halwe eeu gelede — is hy aangestel as professor in die teologiese fakulteit

  • Die pastorale sielkundige as diakonale pastor

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1985

    In die bedieningspatroon van die Ned. Geref. Kerk het die pastorale sielkundige die afgelope aantal jare steeds meer op die voorgrond begin tree. Hy is egter 'n problematiese figuur, wie se identiteit van meer as een kant onder bespreking is. In ander lande, selfs in die VSA waar die kerk veel gebruik maak van die sielkunde, is dit moeilik om 'n presiese parallel vir hom te vind. Sowel binne as buite die kerk word hy deur sommige bevraagteken. Da…

  • Die roeping en identiteit van die evangeliedienaar

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1983

    Aanleiding tot die keuse van hierdie tema was 'n gesprek met 'n jong predikant wat slegs enkele maande tevore sy militêre diensplig voltooi het. Hy het een en ander te vertel gehad omtrent sy ervaringe gedurende hierdie tyd. Dit is natuurlik moontlik om as dienspligkapelaan diens te doen sonder om werklik na aan die manskappe vir wie jy verantwoordelik is, te kom

  • Preekteks of preteks

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1982

    Die leser van hierdie artikel sou met reg kon opmerk: "Wat ’n preekteks is, weet ek, maar wat is "n preteks?" Hierdie on-Afrikaanse woord vir voorwendsel wil wys op die gevaar dat die teks in die prediking misbruik kan word, sodat dit nie die bron is waaruit die preek groei nie, maar bloot ’n voorwendsel wat origens maar min met die inhoud van die preek te doen het. Dit gryp terug op ’n opmerking van A. van Veldhuizen dat die teks wat deur die pr…

  • N Kritiese kyk na die noutetiese beraad van Jay E. Adams

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1980

    Op die terrein van die pastorale sorg is Jay Adams 'n kontroversiële figuur. Hy is 'n vrugbare skrywer wie se geskrifte by hul duisende verkoop word. Sy benadering het veral aanklank gevind by behoudende, skrifgetroue predikante, aangesien hy ou Gereformeerde waarhede in die taal van vandag oordra en standpunt inneem teen invloedryke rigtinge van ons tyd

  • The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2013•Cited by: 11•References: 13

    I defend the theory that one's life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good. Call this the good cause account ( GCA ) of the meaning of life. It holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one's life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good. I argu…

  • The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•BOOK•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2017•Cited by: 5

    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love offers a wide array of original essays on the nature and value of love. The editors, Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts, have assembled an esteemed group of thinkers, including both established scholars and younger voices. The volume contains thirty-three essays addressing both issues about love as well as key philosophers who have contributed to the philosophy of love, such as Plato, Kierkegaard, Schopenha…

  • Less Good but Not Bad

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2012•Cited by: 4

    In this article I defend innocuousism – a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On…

  • Immortality and Significance

    Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy and literature•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Although I reject his argument, I defend Bernard Williams's claim that we would lose reason to go on if we were to live forever. Through a consideration of Borges's story "The Immortal," I argue that immortality would be motivationally devastating, since our decisions would carry little weight, our achievements would be hollow victories of mere diligence, and the prospect of eternal frustration would haunt our every effort. An immortal life for t…

  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part II

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 2•References: 22

    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view …

  • Art and Negative Affect

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 12

    Why do people seemingly want to be scared by movies and feel pity for fictional characters when they avoid situations in real life that arouse these same negative emotions? Although the domain of relevant artworks encompasses far more than just tragedy, the general problem is typically called the paradox of tragedy. The paradox boils down to a simple question: If people avoid pain then why do people want to experience art that is painful? I discu…

  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part I

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 34

    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view …

  • N Kritiese kyk na die noutetiese beraad van Jay E. Adams

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1980

    Op die terrein van die pastorale sorg is Jay Adams 'n kontroversiële figuur. Hy is 'n vrugbare skrywer wie se geskrifte by hul duisende verkoop word. Sy benadering het veral aanklank gevind by behoudende, skrifgetroue predikante, aangesien hy ou Gereformeerde waarhede in die taal van vandag oordra en standpunt inneem teen invloedryke rigtinge van ons tyd

  • Preekteks of preteks

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1982

    Die leser van hierdie artikel sou met reg kon opmerk: "Wat ’n preekteks is, weet ek, maar wat is "n preteks?" Hierdie on-Afrikaanse woord vir voorwendsel wil wys op die gevaar dat die teks in die prediking misbruik kan word, sodat dit nie die bron is waaruit die preek groei nie, maar bloot ’n voorwendsel wat origens maar min met die inhoud van die preek te doen het. Dit gryp terug op ’n opmerking van A. van Veldhuizen dat die teks wat deur die pr…

  • Die roeping en identiteit van die evangeliedienaar

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1983

    Aanleiding tot die keuse van hierdie tema was 'n gesprek met 'n jong predikant wat slegs enkele maande tevore sy militêre diensplig voltooi het. Hy het een en ander te vertel gehad omtrent sy ervaringe gedurende hierdie tyd. Dit is natuurlik moontlik om as dienspligkapelaan diens te doen sonder om werklik na aan die manskappe vir wie jy verantwoordelik is, te kom

  • Die pastorale sielkundige as diakonale pastor

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1985

    In die bedieningspatroon van die Ned. Geref. Kerk het die pastorale sielkundige die afgelope aantal jare steeds meer op die voorgrond begin tree. Hy is egter 'n problematiese figuur, wie se identiteit van meer as een kant onder bespreking is. In ander lande, selfs in die VSA waar die kerk veel gebruik maak van die sielkunde, is dit moeilik om 'n presiese parallel vir hom te vind. Sowel binne as buite die kerk word hy deur sommige bevraagteken. Da…

  • G.M. Pellissier oor die prediking

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1986

    In 'n sekere sin kan professor Pellissier die vader van die teologiese fakulteit van die Ned. Geref. Kerk aan die Universiteit van Pretoria genoem word. George Murray Pellissier was naamlik die eerste en vir vier jaar lank die enigste professor van die Ned. Geref. Kerk in die teologiese fakulteit aan die Universiteit van Pretoria. In 1934 — tans al meer as 'n halwe eeu gelede — is hy aangestel as professor in die teologiese fakulteit

  • Uitbranding in die bediening

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Verbum et Ecclesia•1988•References: 1

    Ministry burnout Burnout is a hazard to which professional care-givers in the various helping professions are exposed. In this article burnout is described as a multidimensional construct, characterised by a state of emotional overload and subsequent exhaustion, resulting in a state of emotional detachment and depersonalisation. This must be differentiated from related conditions, such as tedium, stress and depression. Burnout as an occupational …

  • Art and Negative Affect

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2009•Cited by: 2•References: 12

    Why do people seemingly want to be scared by movies and feel pity for fictional characters when they avoid situations in real life that arouse these same negative emotions? Although the domain of relevant artworks encompasses far more than just tragedy, the general problem is typically called the paradox of tragedy. The paradox boils down to a simple question: If people avoid pain then why do people want to experience art that is painful? I discu…

  • Immortality and Significance

    Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy and literature•2011•Cited by: 3•References: 2

    Although I reject his argument, I defend Bernard Williams's claim that we would lose reason to go on if we were to live forever. Through a consideration of Borges's story "The Immortal," I argue that immortality would be motivationally devastating, since our decisions would carry little weight, our achievements would be hollow victories of mere diligence, and the prospect of eternal frustration would haunt our every effort. An immortal life for t…

  • The power to make others worship

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Religious Studies•2012

    Can any being worthy of worship make others worship it? I think not. By way of an analogy to love, I argue that it is perfectly coherent to think that one could be made to worship. However, forcing someone to worship violates their autonomy, not because worship must be freely given, but because forced worship would be inauthentic – much like love earned through potions. For this reason, I argue that one cannot be made to worship a fitting object;…

  • Less Good but Not Bad

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2012•Cited by: 4

    In this article I defend innocuousism – a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On…

  • Five Tests for What Makes a Life Worth Living

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•The Journal of Value Inquiry•2013

  • The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•The Southern Journal of Philosophy•2013•Cited by: 11•References: 13

    I defend the theory that one's life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good. Call this the good cause account ( GCA ) of the meaning of life. It holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one's life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good. I argu…

  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part I

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 1•References: 34

    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view …

  • Normative Reasons for Love, Part II

    Open Access•Aaron Smuts•ARTICLE•Philosophy Compass•2014•Cited by: 2•References: 22

    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons view …

  • Welfare, Meaning, and Worth

    Aaron Smuts•BOOK•Welfare, Meaning, and Worth•2017

    Welfare, Meaning, and Worth argues that there is more to what makes a life worth living than welfare, and that a good life does not consist of what is merely good for the one who lives it. Smuts defends an objective list theory that states that the notion of worth captures matters of importance for which no plausible theory of welfare can account. He puts forth that lives worth living are net high in various objective goods, including pleasure, m…

  • The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•BOOK•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2017•Cited by: 5

    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love offers a wide array of original essays on the nature and value of love. The editors, Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts, have assembled an esteemed group of thinkers, including both established scholars and younger voices. The volume contains thirty-three essays addressing both issues about love as well as key philosophers who have contributed to the philosophy of love, such as Plato, Kierkegaard, Schopenha…

  • The “No Reasons” View

    Aaron Smuts•CHAPTER•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2023

    Although we can try to explain why we love, we can never justify our love. Love is neither based on reasons, nor is it responsive to reasons, nor can it be assessed for normative reasons. Love can be odd, unfortunate, fortuitous, or even sadly lacking, but it can never be appropriate or inappropriate. We may have a variety of reasons to act on our love, but we cannot justify our loving feelings. Shakespeare’s Bottom was right: “Reason and love ke…

  • Dedication

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•CHAPTER•Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy…•2024

  • Copyright Page

    Christopher Grau, Aaron Smuts•EDITOR•OTHER•The Oxford Handbook of the…•2024

Philosophy (14 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (9 works) · Theology (8 works) · Psychoanalysis (6 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Art (3 works)

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