The land of make-believe
Metaphor, explanation, and fiction in Toon’s psychological world
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591771 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tamás Demeter (0000-0001-9202-5456, HUN-REN Research Centre for the Humanities, corresponding author), László Kocsis (0000-0003-3147-2281, University of Pecs), Krisztián Pete (0000-0002-8454-195X, University of Pecs) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1087-1101 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2436527 |
| OpenAlex | W4405102341 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 17 |
In Mind as Metaphor, Adam Toon interprets folk psychological discourse metaphorically. Based on Kendall Walton’s theory of metaphor, he argues that folk psychology ought to be understood in terms of prop-oriented make-believe that relies on representationally essential metaphors. Toon insists that this fictionalist view of everyday mental talk preserves what we commonly think folk psychology can achieve: it does not only rationalize but explains behavior causally. In this paper, first we raise concerns about Toon’s characterization of folk psychology as metaphorical. Then we proceed to show that representationally essential metaphors are incompatible with genuine causal explanation. And finally, we argue that no construal of mental fictionalism can preserve the epistemic virtues we commonly ascribe to folk psychological discourse
Cognitive science · Construal level theory · Construals · Epistemology · Folk psychology · Linguistics · Metaphor · Action Observation and Synchronization · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Social Representations and Identity
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |